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however, this importance for it is this very importance which 
justifies our attention to what might appear an insignificant 
aspect of his work. Marxism possesses .vital and practical 
problems for the contemporary age. It represents a challenge 
to the social and economic values and traditions of the age and, 
equally it posaessea1an intellectual argument which demands con-
sideration:. 
Whilat, in philosophy, we may generally regard the practical 
effects of doctrines as of little relevance to their truth or 
valid.ity, we must recognise that the position is different with 
Marxism. This system stands aa a revolptionary doctrine. Ita 
aim is practical; its philosphical analysis establishes both the 
necessity for action and the goal of that action. Marxism is 
the expression of an endeavour to change and mould social develop~ 
ment. It meets and attempts to refute doctrines both on the 
pla•e of reason and on that of practice. Thus, it is as a poli-
tical weapon as well as a philosophical interpretation that it 
itself must be discussed. We cannot without violating its in-
herent unity refuse to consider it as a partisan ideology. We 
dare not., merely because it is a partisan ideology, refuse to con~ 
aider its claim to be true and self-coherent. 
We must decide how, if applied, its theory of individualism 
would affect the actual position of men in society. We must con-
aider whether it bas, in tact, a consistent theory to be applied 
and, if so, what this theory is and whence it is derived. We 
must see in what way it is connected with the underlying philoso-
phical presuppositions, metaphysical and methodological, of Marxis~. 
3 ... 
As a materialist philosophy Marxism ia related to that posi-
tion popularised in the early post-Renaissance period by such 
thinkers as Gali~ Hobbes and others. Modern materialism is 
derived from the doctrine that the nature of the Universe and 
human behaviour may be studied by those methods which obtained 
successful application within natural science. The initial pre ... 
suppoai tion underl7J.D.g :this belief' was that all the phenomene.!l•'/ 
l 
with which we are faced are reducable to material relationships 
such as cause-ef'f'ect and are in reality problems demanding scien-
tific treatment as involving the material interaction of bodies. 
Dialectical Materialism 
Marxian dialectical materialism 
-/!A 
traQ.i tion of thought and pa;iri&:lly in the opposing tradition. As 
~ 
'dialectical' it represents an attempt to maintain the Idealist 
~I6•L'(JOC 
tradition. Dialectics, originally conceivedAas the motion of 
thought in the analysis of' ideas or as the development and clari• 
fication of ideas, are fundamental to this tradition. Thought 
is conceived as having a logical development and as being based 
upon a logical pattern. Dialectical thought rests upon the prew 
mise that ideas are not static and that the truth is attainable 
only through the clash of ideas in debate, argument, discussion 
and criticism. 
We have in knowledge, that is, not merely a set of indepen-
dent and absolute truths. The coherence and advance of knowledge 
rests upon the inherent dynamic of ideas which, themselves, are not 
final but mere stages in gradually advancing coherence. Flat 
4 .. 
denials and complete contradiction are inadmissable on dialecti-
cal logic for every truth is partial. Every denial involves a 
qualifying and positive affirmation. Every doctrine or idea re-
presents both a denial and an affirmation. Truth is attainable, 
therefore, on the sole method of removing inconsiatsn~ in-
coherence by the clash of partial truths. Each such clash brings 
forth a higher, more complete and less limited truth. 
~iuch ao advance is termed a synthesis which is the product 
""'""' of a process of negation of thesis by anti-thesis. Further, ......_... 
each such advance is possessed of a higher degree of truth than 
either of the earlier elements. Each synthesis, in its turn, 
produces its own negation by the necessary incompleteness of it• 
self. Only that which is completely true would not produce an 
anti thesis since that which is completely true is, on dialectical 
logic, that which is utterly self .. coherent and. complete. No lao .. 
lated fact or theory is, therefore, completely true. We may, 
however, attain degrees of truth by the application of this theory 
of the movement of thought. 
Dialectical logic involves, therefore, the non-validity of ~ 
the law of contradiction, the acceptance of a theory of degrees of 
truth and the idea that a partial truth produces its own opposite 
or negation. It involves, too, that the true is the self-con-
s1stent and that the true or the real is that which conforms to 
Reason by which it is discovered. There is, there is asserted, 
an essential compatibility between Reason or Mind and Truth for, 
~ 
unless there ~a, the latter would be unattainable by the former. 
Tbe implications of this doctrine are manifold. They may 
be stated briefly as follows: 
1. Dialectic involves the idea that men share reason and 
are essentially rational creatures. 
2. Dialectics presumes the necessity for mutual aid in the 
search for truth and, therefore, the natural basis of 
human co-operation. 
3. By seeing truths as gaining their real status within a 
larger and more coherent system, dialectics involves 
the idea that the isolated individual parts of any syaM 
tam are leas real and less truly themselves when they 
are conceived in isolation. 
5. Dialectical logic repudiates any conception of society 
as composed of independent minds belonging to atomistic 
individuals who can gain intercourse with others only by 
means of external contact. 
Marxism rests upon dialectical or Idealist logic. The 1m-
portance of which the Idealist method has for Marxism will become 
clear as we proceed. We must, however, before tracing that 1m• 
portance, show in what form dialectics reached Marxism and how it 
affected crucially Marx's theory of the 1nd1v1dual{l). 
Dialectics as we have seen is a logic of change. Purely as 
log1c, however, such change has no temporal nature. It was, 
rather, conceived as the process of the e~plication of inherent 
(1) That political theory not based upon the Idealist logical 
tradition of Plato, Aristotle and others, terminating in Hegel 
and the British ·Idealists, involves a radically different indi-
vidualism as we shall later show. 
r 
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0~[Af'lll 
implications within the order of the world• Originally, it was, 
Gild therefore, aa unconnected with temporal evolution && the order of 
Nature was conceived as static. Such was the Greek Idealist con-
ception which underw•nt modification under the impact of both 
Greek materialist philosophy and of later historical and scienti-
fic theories. 
Thus, although a logical doctrine, dialectical theory did not 
remain unaffected by such doctrines as those of Heraclitus which 
interpreted change not as mere explication but as a temporal de-
velopment within the natural world. "Everything is and also is 
not, for everything is in flux, is constantly changing, constantly 
coming into being and passing away"(2). The logical system and 
the naturalist theory of change became in that doctrine inevitably 
fused. Dialectical logic passed into dialectical ph1losophy of 
change and flux and science found in it that metaphysical basis 
upon which it later erected those theories of historical change 
and evolution of which Marxism is an expression. 
' 
As a scientific and philosophical principle dialectics re-
vealed the inadequacy of the earlier doctrine, already disproved 
[/--
in the realm of ideas, that what is cannot be something else, that 
"a thing either exists or it does not exist". It showed in the 
natural world the validity of the principle which it had demon-
strated in the elucidation of truth, that it is by no means true 
that "positive and negative absolutely exclude one another". It 
(2) F. Engels. Socialism, Utopian and Scientific. p.asc. '-'' 




showedA that the doctrine which held that:Y~ .. "always reaches a 
limit beyOnd which it becomes one-sided, limited, abstract and 
loses its way in insoluble contradictions. And this is so be-
cause in considering individual things it loses sight of their 
connections; in contemplating their existence it forgets their 
coming into being and passing away •••••• " (3). 
Dialectical thought became central in the Idealist tradition 
and it expanded to include a philosophy of history,~ J t was in 
this form - as a philosophy of history - that, with Hegel, it in-
I 
fluenced Marx. Marx, it must be remembered, was a'Hegelian dur-
ing his early years and Marxism itself represents not so much a 
revolt against Hegelianism as a modification and correction 
thereof. 
Marx,, therefore, accepted the Hegelian principle that the 
logical categories of dialectical thought must be a~plied to hu-
man knowledge and philosophy. Hegel presented "the whole natur-
al, historical and spiritual world as a process, and attempted to 
show the internal interNconnections in the development of history. 
Hegel emphasized the non-finalistic nature of human thought and 
knowledge. His importance for Marx lies in the fact that he as-
serted that "truth, the cognition of which is the business or phi-
~ 
losophy, {was) no longer an aggregate of finished dogmatic stateN ~ 
ments ••••••• "{4) 
It was for Marx, in his critique of Hegelianism, to relate 
(J) Ibid.p16C 
(4) F. Engels, "Ludwig Fe:flerbach't. SdecJeJ. we.,.ks p., 2.1 ,., H 
... 8 ... 
this position to the concrete economic and political changes in 
society. In this critique Marx claimed that on Hegel's own 
principles his system of thought was undermined for, although 
his doctrines repudiated "system-building" in philosophy, "he 
was compelled to make a system, and in accordance with all tradi~ 
tional requirements, a system of absolute truth".~ Marx 
recognised that on his own premises Hegel should postulate his" 
tory as the only absolute truth. Hegel, however, is forced to 
end his philosophy and this he does by introducing the Absolute 
Idea from which the historical process emanates and to which it 
returns. History ends with human cognition of the Absolute 
Idea w and this cognitio~magined was reached in the Hegelian 
system. Thus Marx and Engels hold that, starting by repudiating 
: 
dogmatism, Hegelianism ends in a finalistic dogma. For this 
reason, they continue, Hegelianism was conservative instead of 
being revolutionary and the source or this contradiction lies in 
the purely Idealist application of dialectical logic which is not 
applied to real events in the real world. 
"The thoughts within his mind were to him not the more or 
less abstract image• of real things and processes, but on the con• 
trary, things and their development were to him only the images 
made real of the 1idea' existing somewhere or other already before 
the world existed~5). Hegelianism which grasped correctly and 
with insight many individual inter-connections" was unsound for, 
both in its logical and metaphysical theories and its view of the 
{5) Engels, ~ew~ Fea&PQ&cb. 
~oc..i ''"" ,uhp•·ttn ~ ~c.c't"~ifl~, Sc.l.lVO'I'k.!. ~ tfll 
--- --~-------~-~~--~-- ----
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relation of the individual to the state, it missed the assent-
!ally revolutionary nature of dialectical thought. As such, 
and despite its enormous contributions, Hegelianism, for Marx 
and Engels, was lnca .. ble, in itself, of fruitful development. 
It had to give way to~eal and positive knowledge of the world"(6). 
Marx realised that such knowledge would not be attained by 
a reJectlo~of Hegelianism, but rather by a retreat to a modified 
version of 18th century historical naturalism. He boasted that 
he had stood Hegel on his head; in fact he did not. Rather, 
in place of the Hegelian dialectic which "begins with thought, 
goes on to nature, and ends with mind", Mirx postulated a differ-
ent order by referring "to the first and second terms only, not 
the third". His dialectic "began with nature and went on to 
~ 
thought", whereas Hegel 1s began with thought and went on to 
nature. (7) 
Marx's return to a naturalistic position took place concur-
rently with a vigorous criticism by him of all earlier material-
ism. The basic point of the critique is that these philosophies, 
whilst correctly giving priority to the real world, are funda-
mentally inaccurate in their reliance on a monistic theory of 
force or energy. They are crude philosophies resulting from the 
transferance of the catesorles of ph~slcal science into fields 
where they are not applicable. They do not solve, any more than 
conservative Idealism solves, such problems as that of the nature 
of 1nd1v1dual1sm or the source of political obligation and social 
(6) Engels, op cit.~ 111S 




The error of early materialism is seen by Marx to be the op-
posite error to ~hat of Hegelianism for, unlike the latter, early 
naturalism based its methodology upon a process of detaching phe-
nomena "from their natural or historical connections ••• (and of 
examining) each one separately, as to its natura, its special 
causes and effects, etc."(8). This methodr-derived from the re-
solutive - compositive method of Galilee and, later, Hobbes - was 
analysis of problems into individual parts and the classification 
of these parts •nd their processes into various classes.(9) En-
gels comments that this method has left us as a legacy the habit 
of observing natural objects and natural processes in their isola-
tion, detached from the whole vast interconnection of things, and 
therefore not in their motion but in their repose; not as essen-
tially changing, but as fixed constants; not in their life but in 
their death. Valid as this method was in the scientific advances 
of the period, when, as with Bacon and(o~~ , it was transferred 
to philosophy it falsely regarded "things and their mental images, 
ideas, (as) isolated, to be considered one after another, apart 
from each other, rigid fixed objects of investigation given once 
for allu.(lO) 
Being unable to think dialectically, this for9Pf materialism 
produced not an acceptable theory of the dynamic inter-relation of 
mind and matter, part and whole, individual and group, but a doct-
(8) F. Engels, Socialism, Utopian and Scientific /#,,., ft 
(9) Political Philos. of Hobbes byAstrauss. 
(10) F. Engels, Socialism, Utopian~d Scientific.!~'' 
-- -~ ----------
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rine of the monism of force upon which even intellect~ became 
reduced to a form of physical energy and the ultimate basis, the 
essential foundation, of the universe was believed to be material 
force. Man became a machine, society a field in which individ-
ual machines clashed and co-existed. And for Marxism the funda-
mental error of this system lay in tbe fact that it~ was an "ex~ 
elusive application of the standards of mechanics to processes of 
/ 
a chemical and organic nature - in which processes it is true, the 
laws of mechanics are also valid, but are pushed into the back-
ground by other and higher laws - (and this application) consti-, 
tuted a specific ••• limitation of classical French materialism".(ll) 
This materialism could not "comprehend the universe as a process". 
Nature became conceived as static, society as a mechanical inter-
relation of materially determined and atomistic individuals and 
man'himself as a creature without free-will. Marxism regarded 
this interpretation as partial and incomplete. 
Materialism conceived "the object, reality, sensuousness ••••• 
only in the form of the object or £Ontemplation but not as human 
sensuous activity, practice, not subjectively".(l2) Its error, 
as opposed to the Idealist mistake of emphasizing human abstract 
activity, was that it could not see man as an agent but merely as 
an object of natural processes. Marx, therefore, condemns both 
the materialism which denies the partial independence of human ac-
tivity and the idealism which denies the reality of the empirical 
world and which asserts the primacy ~f thought. 
(11) Engels, Ludwig Federbach. p ftS7 ,._.,. 
(12) Marx, Thesis on FeMerbach. 
And we shall 
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note the importance of these objections for an investigation into 
individualism More broadly, the principles embodied in these 
two critiques are of immense importance for Marxism. 
Hegelianism Marxism regards as partial for, although it truly 
sees history as a process of "causal interconnection of the pro-
gressive movement from the lower to the higher, which asserts it .. 
self through all zig-zag movements and temporary set-backs", it 
falsely sees this process as "a miserable copy of the eelf~ove­
ment of the concept going on from eternity ••• independent of the 
thinking brain.(l3) 
1\0WCIII~' 
Materialis~4represents the partial, yet valuable, discoveries 
of natural science as capable of general application in all 
fields. It repudiates human activity and true social life on 
the principles of mechanism. 
Marxism accepts the validity of the application or dialectiM 
cal logic to history. It accepts the Hegelian doctrine summed 
up in the following statement from Hegel's "science of Logic",(l4) 
"The only thing which is required for scientific progress, an 
elementary principle for the understanding or which we should real-
ly strive, is the recognition of the logical principle that the 
negative is just as much a positive, or that the contradictory 
does not really resolve into nothing, into an abstract nothingness, 
but actually only into the negation of a special content •••••• In 
so far as the resultant, the negation, is a definition it has 
content. It is a new conception, but a higher and richer concep-
(13) F. Engels, Ludwig Fetrerbach Set.w.wk,. ptff1.L 
(14) Quote• by M. Beer, Life and Teaching of Karl Marx p. 19•20. 
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tion than the preceding one; for it has been enriched by the 
negation or antithesis of this; it therefore contains it, and 
more than contains it, being indeed the synthetic unity of itself 
and its contrary". Marxism acc,pts this and applies it to the 
struggle of classes in history, the building of society, the re-
lation of mind and matter. 
Marxism accepts as valid the methods of materialism upon the 
lower levels. It accepts moreover the attempt to show a natural 
causal interconnection between events in the real world. It re-
vives the principle that philosophy rests upon science. Marxism 
merges materialism and Idealism into what 1t calls dialectical 
materialism. 
Dialectical materialism is essentially a theory which applies 
the ideas of logical movement to the natural world. Within the 
term "natural world" is included, for Marx, society and political 
and economic events. Basically, it sees this world as constant-
ly changing according to particular patterns of movement the nat-
out-
ure of which we hav~lreadyAlivedo The underlying principle is 
that of a clash between partial truths, in the case of thought, 
and incomplete and non-self~coherent phenomena, in the case of 
science or society. Each of the elements within these clashes 
is partially real yet the partiality of each 'produces' the anti~ 
thesis or negation of tht element. The overcoming of this contra-
dictory situation produces a higher, more complete, synthesis which, 
in its turn, produces its own opposite. The very nature of such 
clashes makes reality coherent for they demonstrate its indivisi-
bility and its interdependence. Each level is depend•nt upon 
... 14 .. 
every other; every element is both dependent upon and in contra-
diction with every other within the whole. 
Marxism claims that dialectical materialism is the true 
metaphysical basis of all knowledge and hence our investigations 
into Marx's theory of the individual is an investigation into an 
aspect of dialectical materialism. Dialectical materialism, 
whilst it does not prescribe the da~ailed method of each science, 
~ is regarded as providing the methodological framework of all 
science. Marxism claims that every event or phenomenon must be 
seen as a relation to a whole and that, as isolated, such events 
or phenomena are incomplete. We shall tind that just as we can-
not truly estimate the nature of a cell or an atom or a wheel with-
out reference to its function, its history and its environment 
so we cannot understand the individual without reference to equi• 
hi-
valent factors surrounding and modifying ~. We shall see that 
for Marx, although he never reduces one level of knowledge to 
another, individualism must be studied dialectically since the 
formal principles of dialectics are universal. In the case of 
the individual, his nature must be seen in terms of history and 
economic interest and in terms of his inherent social nature which 
these express. 
We must, bac~e of its importance, examine rather more thor-
oughly the Marx~ theory of the various dialectical laws the ap-
plication of which to our problem will become obvious later. 
These laws are held to be valid in philosophic and scientific 
method and are put forward as an explanation of the coherent pat-
tern and motion of things and thought. This;,: like Hegel's, is a 
... 15 .., 
revolutionary theory. It makes history and development towards 
newer and higher forms cardinal in political and scientific theory. 
Nevertheless, it must not be confused with Darwinian evolutionism. 
As Vaughan warns:Cl5) 
"To them (the Darwinians) evolution is, in the first instance, 
a key to the mysteries of a world which lies outside and apart 
from man; which human reason has no share in constituting; in 
relation to which, the only function of reason is to apprehend and 
to interpret it. In this sense, the part of evolution is to simw 
plify the endless diversity of organic • and to some extent also 
of 1nor~n1c -nature; to trace the stages by which the higher 
forms of life, or being, have through countless ages been elabor-
ated from the lower". For Hegel and Marx, however, evolution is 
not separable from the subject and from the development of con~ 
sciousness. We do not stand aside from its procesaes, we are 
part of them. 
The development which dialectical materialism traces is not 
to be visualised as a straight line, but rather as a zig-zag. 
This is a basic principle, and, applying it to social development, 
Engels says:(l6) "the historical fact upon which dialectics in-
sists is that the rise of each civilisation has represented a loss 
as well as a gain, and the fall of each o1v1lisat1on ••• a gain 
as well as a loss". Better expressed, we may say that the h1stor1-
cal process - in nature, evolution, in society (history) - follows 
( 15) "Studies in the History of Poll tical Philosophy'' p. 144 
(16) ~ted Strachey, "Theory and Practice of Socialism" p.382 
-
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a spiral movement, at each successive level contradictions are 
overcome, and each new level represents a synthesis, a contradic-
tion, and simultaneously, a conditioned product, of a less consis-
tent stage. Each stage is a negation of the previous stage, each 
negation being itself negated. 
This is known as the law of the 'negation of the negation'. 
No negation is a flat contradiction for, as we have seen, bare de-
nial is inadmissable in dialectical logic. As in logic, so in 
history; there is no contradiction only contrariety. This law 
is related to another: "the interpenetration of opposites". 
This may be explained as follows. Each phase is relatively 
incomplete because it is incoherent and self-contradictory. This 
means that each phase produces its own opposite or negation which, 
though also partial and incomplete, negates it. This relation 
of opposites, each qualifying the other, makes them interdependent 
for each represents partially that truth or coherence which each 
is striving to attain. 
Negation itself takes place in the transformation of quantity 
into quality and quality into quantity. This concept is illus-
trated in science by the production of a qualitatively different 
substance steam when the amount of heat applied to water is in-
creased. (17) Similarly, all change is conue1nd by Marx a.s grad ... 
ual, the factors promoting it accumulating it until they produce 
a sufficiently self-contradictory state. When this occurs a 
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(17) Hegel in his.Logic: gives a similar example to illustrate 
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l·Und and Matter 
Before leaving the general outline of dialectical materialism 
we must diseuse one important point. In any discussion of the 
nature of society we must bear in mind that no s~lf-consistent 
theory of individualism can be maintained unless a consistent 
theory of the relations of mind and matter i~ also held. Marx-
ism is faced with the problem of whether matter can think. If 
it cannot then Marxism must either fall into a dualism, the resow 
lution of which would undermine either ita materialism or its 
dialectioalism or it must become a monism by reducing matter to 
mind or mind to a mere epiphenomenon of matter. If this last is 
the case, Marxism must become a crude determinist theory which 
would make the solution of the problem of individualism impossible 
on any basis save that of Hobbes 1 • 
Dialectical materialism, however, answers the problem by as-
serting that whilst mind is matter it has laws of its own and is 
capable of an inde~ndence as against matter on a lower level. 
Marxism holds, firstly, that mind is a process rather than a sub-
stance. Moreover, what this process perceives is sensuous r•al- ~ 
ity. Marxism postulates a unity of mind and matter on the prin-
ciple that "the material, sensuously perceptible world to which 
we ourselves belong is the only reality; and that our conscious-
ness and thinking, however supra-sensuous they may seem, are the 
product of a material bodily organ, the brain. lllla tter is not a 
product of mind, but mind its~ is merely the highest product of 
matter.(l9) Although materialism, this doctrine maintains its 
(19) F. Engels, "Ludwig Fe•erbach" s.w. Volm •• p 435 
• 
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essentially dialectical character by asserting that "thougpt, 
~. is not a substance added to matter, it is a function of 
a certain kind of matter".(20) "Marxism", says Lewis, "does 
not deny the reality either of life or mind. It asserts, how-
ever, that they are functions of a highly organised matter on 
the organic level ••••• "(21). Its laws are not those of the 
mechanical level, nor are its laws beyond scientific analysis. 
The important point is, however, not that Marxism repudiates 
meChanical materialism or absolute idealism but that in doing eo 
it holds that consciousness and its objects, mind and matter, 
~M 
the thinker and his environment, are not divided but~a unity. 
Mind is not reduced to matter eo much as bo~h are manifestation~ 
on different levels,of natural processes. Ideas are derived 
from the empirical world but they are not mere impressions upon 
a passive receiving tablet ~ the mind. Marxism stands with Idea-
liem in holding the creative cha~acter of thought. Cognition 
requires active participation by the thinker and in this sense 
we create what we think. Idealism developed this aspect of the 
matter and made reality dependent upon thin~ing; materialism 
ignored it and made mind a passive contemplative recep~le of 
impressions. Marxism dialectically unites these partial truths. 
Similarly it makes mind a high form of matter and matter a low 
form of mind. Both are one; mind and matter are not opposing 
extremes. 
(20) ~. Lewis, "Marxism and Modern Idealism" p. 16 
{21) Ilid • 
' 
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In fact, Marxism regards the debate between Idealism and 
materialism as based upon a fallacy • 11 It is a mistake to prove 
•••• that mind exists as something over against matter. But it 
is equally a mistake to prove that matter is mindless •••• matter 
can think •••• (and) •••• thinking, being real enough, neverthe~ 
less, never takes place except in brains".(22) In short, the 
Marxist solution is in the form of a resolution of the conflict 
by a synthesis. 
We shall find that this solution is important in the solu-
tion of other difficulties, derived from the same original prob-
lem, concerning the nature and degree of determinism in histori-
cal development, in the development of ideology and in the inter-
action of the individual thinker or leader upon the class and 
society to which he belongs. 
At the moment, however, we must leave these general principles 
and turn to our examination of their application to more specific 
problems. 
. ..... 
(22) Lewis, op cit. 
A '# 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Cult of Individualism 
We have not the opportunity to devote excessive space to an~ 
historical survey of the conditions of society prior to the rise 
of Marxism. There are, however, certain aspects of this back-
ground which are relevant to our subject. 
With the breakdown of the mediaeval social structure and 
the opening of the era of Cartesian philosophy, Europe entered a 
new era. Capitalism which, as Lewis Mumford says, (p. 159 Con-
d1t1on of Man), "was •••• the greatest heresy of the Middle Ages: 
the chief challenge to the ideal claims of Christianity •••• (and 
which, indeed) •••• had been nourished in the very bosom of the 
Church and almost from the first had the protection of the Papacy", 
was the prevailing economic and social structure. 
The economic nature of capitalism will be discussed in gener~ 
al later, we shall turn now to a consideration of the new outlook 
which developed under Capitalism and it will be convenient to 
contrast it at points wLth that offthe preceding era. The great-: 
est challenge which Capitalism presented to the Mediaeval order 
was moral. "The Cap1 tal1st personal! ty", says Mlulford (Ibid p. 
-
161) "directed to self-help and gain, was the antithesis to the 
Christian who sought to love hie neighbour as himself . . . . . Ava-
rice ceased to be a sin: the minute attention to the case of 
~orldly goods, the hoarding of pennies, the unwillingness to spend 
.. 22 ~ 
one's surplus on others • these habits were useful for capital 
saving •••• Riches now acquired sanctity: they opened the gates 
of the Kingdom. 
Glory". 
They furnished the power. They created the 
Industry, commerce, based upon the desire for private profit 
undermined the old social structure and destroyed the mediaeval 
community. "social justice was more important than private ad• 
-
vantage''. (Mumford Ibid 163). A new cult of individualism 
arose. 
codes. 
This individualism transformed the valuational, moral 
The individual nad become the centre, around whom the 
economic life centred and upon whom the social and political or-
gan1sation of society rested. The economic man became-, in the 
19th century, an entity undreamed of in the earlier epoch, but 
whose roots lay in the 16th and 17th centuries. 
The philosophy of the age was best expressed by Hobbes and 
Descartes. In the former's work was expressed the new concep-
tion of social life based upon the struggling of human atoms. 
For Hobbes society was a battleground, man's life a struggle for 
power w a struggle between what Mumford calls 'natural automata'. 
Society is for Hobbes an aggragation of individuals held together 
by the state. 
For Descartes the problem of philosophy became ultimately 
concerned with the individual. A.N. Whitehead says (Science & 
Modern World p. 173 ) : "Modern philosophy is tinged with subject-
ivism, as against the objective attitude of the ancients. The 
same change is to be seen in religion. In the early history of 
the Christian Church, the theological interest centred in discus-
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sions on the nature of God, the meaning of the Incarnation, and 
apocalyptic forecasts of the ultimate fate of the world. At 
the Reformation, the Church was torn asunder by dissension as 
to the individual experiences of believers in respect to justi-
fication. The individual subject of experience had been sub-
stituted for the total drama of all reality. Luther asked: 
"How am I justified?" Modern philosophers have asked: "How do 
I have knowledge?" The emphasis lies upon the subject of ex-
perience. 
The problem of philosophy, that is, became, with Descartes 
in particular, centred upon the individual thinking subject. 
The individual, considered in isolation from his fellows, became 
the starting point of metaphysics as he had become the centre of 
political and social life. 
The new attitude reached its height in the late 18th and 
19th centuries. With increasing mechanisation and industrialism 
came the increasing concentration of philosophical and political 
thinking upon the needs and desires of individuals. But it must 
not be imagined that the individualistic tendencies in thought 
and social action, did not go through a development. A long 
tradition of hedonistic and utilitarian individualism exists. It 
found its expression in the works of many Cartesian thinkers. 
Once given the Cartesian bias, which Descartes summed up in 
his famous dictum "Cogito ergo sum", philosophy developed upon 
, the subjectivist and individualistic liJes. In religion there 
was a tendency to protest the sanctity of the individual and his 
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right to equality with his fellows before God; in political 
theory the doctrines of equal rights, equality of opportunity, 
the 'sanctity of the individual' appeared; and in general it 
became held that 11.! must decide the truth according to my'ligh.ts'". 
The moral theory preached by thinkers a1.nce Hobbes was based on rt 
the principle of self-interest. Pleasure and pain became synoM 
nyms for good and evil and they determined what men did. In the 
struggle for existence the individual recognised - and, on the 
prevailing theory, 'ought' only to recognise - one principle, viz. 
selfwinterest, self-preservation, pleasure. , "It is for them 
(pleasure and pain) alone to point out what we ought to do as well 
as to determine what we shall do11 • 
Mumford op. cit. p. 311). 
(Jeremy Bentham quoted by 
The trend has many facets. We cannot here detail them. We 
may mention, for example, the growth of the historical theory 
which saw history as a struggle between individuals, the trend 
in the arts towards 'individual self-expression and in philosophy 
the development of individualist anarchism'. 
Of this latter trend Max Stirner is an example. His doctrine 
contained the logical conclusion of the thinking of earlier indi-
vidualists who had based their ideas upon a struggle for power 
among individuals but who regarded community life (the State) as 
the protection of all in the carrying on of life. Stirner empha-
sised greatly the importance not merely of the individual; he 
fought for the supremacy of the ego: 
nLet us therefore not aspire to community but to one-sidedness. 
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Let us not seek the moat comprehensive 'human society', but let 
us seek in others only means and organs which we may use as our 
property!_ As we do not see our equals in the tree, the beast, 
so the presupposition that others are our equals springs from a 
hypocrisy. No one is my equal, but I regard him, equally with 
all beings, as my property". (23) 
This attitude was one implicit in the very nature of capi-
talist competition. It was against it that Marx and Engels 
directed their moral critique. 
shall now turn. 
It is to this critique that we 
The Moral and Historical Critique of Capitalism: 
Marxism, however scientific it may claim to be, is motivated ~ 
by a moral attitude towards ita subject matter. The analysis 
of prevailing and previously existing societies reveals this 
moral attitude at the very outset. In the preface to the Commu-
niat manifesto Engels refers to the purpose of his work and Marx's 
to be that of "freeing the whole of society from exploitation, 
oppression and claaa-atrugglean (Selected Works p. 793). It is 
of fundamental importance that this position should be made clear. 
Marxism as we shall have occasion to see repeatedly does not re-
gard itself as an 'objective' science. As with Hegel, so with 
Marx - the evolutionary process is not apart from man and his 
consciousness. Man is part of it. He does not stand aside from 
it nor does he, recognising his intimate connection with it, allow 
(23) M. Stirner, "The Ego and His Own" p. 227. 
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himself passively to become a part of it. He is active, prac-
tical and stands in a moral relationship to the historical pro-
cess. Man actively takes sides in the class-struggle. 
The Communist manifesto contains a statement of this ethi-
cal position. We need consider the statement, for example, that 
1 the bourgeoisie •••• has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, 
idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the mot~y ------
feudal ties that bound man to his 'natural superiors', and has 
W\'0 
left us A. other nexus between man end man than naked self-interest, 
than callous 'cash-payment' •••• It has resolved personal worth 
into exchange value, and in place of the numberless indefeasible 
chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable free~ 
dom - Free Trade. In one word, for exploitation, veiled by re-
ligious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shame-
less, direct, brutal exploitation". 
Every occupation, every action has become valued in terms of 
its money value, every personal relation - including the family -
has become a money relation. It had, moreover, become true, even 
in Marx's day, that the bourgeoisie brought with it inequality, 
imperialism and colossal, destructive war. The whole basis of 
industrial orgayBsation that had 4eveloped was the turning of 
men to machineso ttMasses of labourers", says llljarx, "crowded in-
to the factory, are .organised like soldiers • • • • not only are 
they slaves of the bourgeois class, and of the bourgeois state, 
they are daily and hourly enslaved by the machine, by the over-
looker, and, above all, by the individual bourgeois manufacturer 
~ a1: .. 
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turn to it. 
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Marx's more general theory of the development. 
We have seen in our earlier examination of the dialectical 
~ 
bases of Marxist philosophy that each successive stage of deve-
lopment is both the product of, and itself contains, inherent 
contradictions. In the realm of social development - history -
these contradictions are manifold, but may broadly be seen as 
the clash of classes. 
For I~rxism history is, therefore, of fundamental importance. 
Every historical epoch, every society that has appeared, is the 
product of division into social classes. The dominant class in 
every epoch establishes the general form of the society. The 
prevailing ideology, political forms, are the ideas and instiM 
tutions of the ruling class. 
The Capitalist society is the creation of the bourgeoisie 
which established the eocial order based on "free competition, 
freedom of movement, equal rights for commodity owners ••• 11 (2.5). 
The old methods of production were supe~eded by large-scale-
machinery; large-scale industry required large and concentrated 
labour-force. 
Under Capitalist mode of production the instruments of lab-
our, which under the earlier system had been individually owned, 
became concentrated in the hands of a relatively small class. 
This concentration was the achievement of the bourgeoisie, which 
developed in the earlier mediaeval epoch. 
In the historical epoch preceding the present bourgeois order 
(25} Engels, Anti-Duhring p. 295. 
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The division of labour has various important results: the 
variety of economic activities - commerce, industry and agricul-
ture - are separated from each other and there is the division 
between1the separation of,town and country. Each new form of 
ownership is bound up with the development of the division of 
labour. 
The first form of ownership is tribal ownership, correspond-
ing to undeveloped productive methods. The social structure is 
based upon patriarchal family relationship and slavery.(27) 
We shall not~ace in detail the anthropological and histori-, 
cal theories of Vmrx and Engels. We shall merely summarise the 
various sta~s of dialectical historical development which they 
postulate. 
After tribal ownership, comes nancient communal and State 
ownershipn based upon slavery; but containing within its gener-
al framework developing private ownership. But this 1s not a 
normal, prevailing phenomenon, and the highly developed class 
structure of society is complete. 
Thirdly,(28) we arrive at feudal relationships. As with 
the e.bove mentioned forms feudalism is "based on a community" (29) 
with the peasantry replacing the slaves as the oppressed class. 
The feudal form of society produced, however, its own destruction 
in that with the growth of towns there developed within the 
bourgeois ~ formsof production. Town came into conflict with 
(27) Marxism postulates the natural stat~ of society as primitive 
communism - a form of common ownership~~~lasslessness. 
(28)Here we are ignoring the influence o~ars of conquest and the 
partial growth in Rome of private ownership and the plebian class. 
(29) German Ideology p. 12. 
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country, and although the mediaeval social structure became adap-
ted to the necessities of trade - with the development of guilds 
and communal markets - it was from the towns that the bourgeois 
order sprang. Feudalism was a country form, a social organisa-
tion of agricultural civilisation. 
The general principle which we may derive from the Marxist 
historical account is that each political and social form is based 
upon the economic structure, i.e. that economic relationships are 
historically basic. 
Men make their own history but not in an incoherent or per-
fectly unconnected fashion. The existence of classes, which is 
"bound up with particular, historic, phases in the development 
of production" (Marx to Weydemeyer), is basic to the understanding 
of history for it is in the clash of classes that we see the his-
toric process manifesting itself. Thus it is in the necessities 
t of this process, which are rooted in the materiar conditions,~~ 
needs, desires and relationships of each epoch, that we must seek 
the key to historical understanding. Necessity override• histori-
cal accident, in the long run. And this necessity is ultimately 
economic necessity. 
Marxism insists that the basic determining influence of eco-
nomic factors in history is not rigid or absolute. In our next 
section we shall deal with the status which intellectual and 
ideological factors attain in this theory. At this point we wish 
to establish the general position of Marx and Engels. The impor-
tance of the individual in Marxist theory is, of course, intimately 
bound up with the doctrine of historical dialectical materialism. 
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The state, we must at this point mention, is seen by this 
theory in a peculiar light. 
between state and society. 
Marx insists upon the distinction 
~e state is organ of society which 
is produced by the contradictions eventuating from the division 
of labour and class division. It is neither of the conflicting 
classes but neverth~less it represents the organised political 
force of the ruling class while maintain~ng a semblance of inde-
pendence. 
"society gives rise to certain common functions which it can-
not dispense with. The persons selected for these functions 
form a new branch of the diviaion of labour within society. This 
gives them particular interests. distinct, too, from the interests 
of those who gave them their office; they make themselves indepen-
dent of the latter and - the state is in being". With the state 
is created political aspects of society and the struggle for con-
trol of the state machinery - in our day police, army, government 
departments - is the political struggle. There develops a clash 
between the economic interests and 'forces' and the political 
which latter are concerned to maintain their independence. This 
clash is one in which economic motivation is "ultimately•• irre-
sistible.(30) This allows a considerable amount of modification 
to take place within the economic framework. Political and legal 
institutions and codes modify, "react upon". divert the narrow eco-
nomic movement and undermine the narrow determinist position of 
q~ItJ-., 
.. (30) The :mpnasis upon the 
nomic motivation is typical 
indicative of the partially 
of history. 
ultimately determining power of eco-
of Marxist confusion on this point and 
realised attempt to make a "science" 
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certain lees critical and careful sections of Marx and Engels. 
The State appears then, as an independent authority over and 
above the clash of classes. It is, however, only independent to 
a very limited extent. Dialectically there must exist an inter-
dependence and interaction between cause and effect, between 1civw 
il society' (i.e. the economic and productive aspects of society) 
and the State. Yet the State exists to finalise existing class 
relationships and to maintain those relationships economic and 
social which have d•valoped. Whilst it may in turn modify these 
the State is the expression of the class division of society. 
We could do no better than follow t~ conclusion which Marx 
his 
draws from theory of history:(31) ... 
(1) "In the development of productive forces there comes a stage 
at which productive forces and means of intercourse are called in-
to existence, which,under existing relationships, only causes mis-
chief, and which are no longer productive forces but destructive 
forces (machinery and money); and connected with this a class is 
called forth, which has to bear all the burdens of society with-
out enJoying its advantages, which, ousted from society, is forced 
into the most decided antagonism to all other classes; a class 
which forms the majority of all members of society, and from which 
emanates the consciousness of the necessity of a tundamental revo-
lution, the communist consciousness, !£!ch max, of course, arise 
among other c~a%%e% too tbrouBn the contemplation of the situation 
of this class.(my italics). 
(2) The conditions under which definite productive forces can 
(31) German Ideology p. 68 
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be applied, are the conditions or the rule of a definite class 
of society whose social power, deriving from its property, has 
1 ts pract1cal-1deal1st1c .. expression in each case in the form of 
the State; and, therefore, every revolutionary struggle is dir-
ected against a class, which till then had been in power ••••• " 
Marx continues to state that the aim of the communist re-
volution is not, as with earlier revolutions, ••• aimed at a re-
distribution of the mode of activity of society (i.e. a change 
in ownership and control of productive forces), but is aimed at 
the abolition of the whole mode of activity i.e. at the abolition 
of classes, nationalities and "labour". Further this revolution 
is essentially a mass movement against the conditions and rela-
tionships of 'civil society' and, as he emphasises elsewhere (e.g. 
The Eighteenth Bruma1~of Louis Napoleon), against the existence 
of the State itself. 
Philosophy and the Individual 
The individual is in Marxist philosophy in a peculiarly 1m-
portant relation to philosophic activity itself. This relation-
ship is given special treatment in ~mrx for his historicism 
throws into prominence the problem of in what way ideology and 
other elements in the so-called 'superstructure of society' are 
to be considered in the light of Marx's atte~pt to retain the 
individual's moral status. Any investigation into this problem 
must consider in what way the intellectual activities of men are 
the products of economic environmental factors and to what extent 
... 
.... 
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they are constructive and vital factors in history. The latter 
question is dealt6 with in the Marxian doctrine of philosophy as 
a weapon. The importance of this doctrine for our study of 
Marx's individualism is clear1 for individualism is meaningless 
if 1,ndiv1dual ideas and philosophy are irrelevant to the course ''v 
of historical events. 
We have noted earlier the emphasis which Marx lays upon the 
relative independence of intellectual and political aspects. 
They are not mere reflections of economic relationships. 
are not, that is to say, mere tpiphenomena. 
They 
We have noted on the other hand, his emphasis on the derived 
nature of these forms of consciousness. 'Ideology', says Engels 
in a letter to Mehring, 'is a process accomplished by the so-
called thinker consciously indeed but with a false consciousness. 
The real motives impelling him are unknown to him, otherwise it 
would not be an ideological process at all n The ideologist, • • • • 
that is, remains in the "realm of pure thought" never realising 
the inter-relation of thought and material reality or the depen-
dance of his thought upon prevailing relationships. These rela-
tionships are, put simply, rthe methods by which human beings in 
a given society produce their means of subsistence •••• 11 (Engels 
to Starkenburg). 
But to deny this independence is not to deny either the 
right to evaluation on a scale of truth nor to deny the effect 
of ideology upon historical development. 
In his "Thesls on Fe~rbach" Marx emphasises that "He (Fener-
~ }6 ~ 
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knowing and doing. Human beings, that is, react upon their en-
vironment, they stand above it, in a certain sense, and yet they 
are bound to attempt to affect it, to modify its course of devel-
opment. The activity of the mind in the activity of judging -
which as idealism has empisised is not a passive, reflective one ... 
but a positive, creative, intelligent one - is transferred into 
another realm. 
Ideology - philosophy, economics, political theories, legal 
doctrines, religions ~ arise in answer to definite human needs. 
These needs are various but include the need to organise socially, 
the need for spiritual satisfaction and peace, the need to under-
•atuiat 
stand how society works, the need to satisfy furtherAneeds and de-
sire so It is the development of these needs and desires which 
is the dynamic of history. 
theoretical activity. 
From these needs an4 desires arises 
The needs of men are here seen as basic, but man having once 
begun to theorize sets out upon a dual process. First, he must 
answer the need for greater coherence and completeness and truth 
in the theories he has begun to forumlate. Secondly, ,he has to 
apply these theories to the world both in order to test them, and 
to attain a mastery over natural processes. These processes sup~ 
plement each other. Theory, the result of needs, is applied in 
answering further needs and in supplying new needs to be answeredo 
Thus, philosophies arise to fulfil a social need - usually a jus-
tification of prevailing ways of life are needed and philosophy 
(including religion) arises to answer the question: How are we 
(or I) justified? 
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This does not mean, however, that philosophy is a mere re-
flection, and justification of, prevailing relationships. It 
may be so and in many cases it has been. Equally, in many cases 
it has led to the conclusion that circumstances are unjust, evil; 
that human beings should change their environment. Theoretical 
activity reflects prevailing conditions, reflects the objective 
historical situation only in the sense that it answers definite 
prevailing needs, its problems are current problems and, moreover, 
its work is limited by the general state of knowledge at the timeo 
Certain theories, against which Marx protested, held that 
' 
ideas are mere impressions on the mind produced by the impact of 
material bodies and, similarly, that philosophic theories were 
merely analytical not constructive or leading to action. For 
Marx, however, theory was a guide to action. Theory has to base 
itself upon existing social needs and demands and upon the existing 
social situationo Thus theory must imply change. 
Th~ory is a guide to action, and practice the living test 
of theory.(32) Practice is not mere practicability but involves 
a dynamic inter-relation of man's will and skill with theory. 
Knowledge, through practice, becomes, as it must, power. We de ... 
sire knowledge for the sake of the power it gives us, not merely 
in the narrow sense~ of domination over physical nature~but equally 
in the intellectual mastery over problems which each stage of 
knowledge gives uso 
(32) Marx was not a pragmatist. His position in this matter may 
be put as follows: "In practice man must prove truth i.e. 
the reality and power, the 'this•sidedness' of hie thinking"o 
1.eo What works will be true, the inherent contradictions of 
the false will lead to practical ineffectiveness. 
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We cannot divert here to study the i•plications of this 
position for a theory of truth. But it is important to note 
Marx's rejection of materialist doctrines of truth which may be 
said to hold that ideas must correspond to reality of which 
ideas are copies, impressions or reflections and of the mater-
ialist theory that all human history and activity were merely 
manifestations of physical mathematical laws, completely deter-
mined by mechanical or chemical processes. These doctrines 
were rejected for the same reason - they omitted the redirective, 
as opposed to the merely reflexive, the active, as opposed to the 
merely passive, the creative, as opposed to the negative, aspects 
of mind. To omit these aspects was to omit the essential point 
that theory was a guide to changing the world to making it true. 
That the individual is not a mere cog in a vast machine but a 
being whose will, through society, can and must become effective 
in changing that society, is essential to Marx's doctrine. 
Marxism, therefore, is not ordinary materialism for it pos-
tulates a revolutionary programme of e.ction and this programme 
is based upon a plan, and involves the notion of planning for 
the future as an important aspect of the sort of society at which 
it is aiming. Nor ordinary materialism can, without self-contra-
diction, hold such a point of view. 
This aspect of Marxism involves us in a form of teleology -
a teleology of ends. We find Marx here in agreement with many 
other thinkers who have held that such a teleology of ends is 
the very basis of moral or political activity. The causal pro-
cess becomes sub-ordinated to the 'higher 1 determinism, and becomes 
\ 
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the means of achieving the end postulated. Human ideals, aims 
or ends are, therefore, in Marx endowed with a practical force. 
The role Of the indiVidual. in this matter Will be dealt~ With 
at greater length later, but we may comment here upon Marx's 
critique, in the light of the above principles, of Utopian soc-
ialism. 
Utopian socialism never appreciated the fact that ideals, 
aims, ends, and the theories which go with them, are 'outgrowths' 
(not products) of prevailing conditions. It failed to see its 
schemes, plans, ideals as answers to historically conditioned de-
ma.nds. (see below 'Consciousness as soci~l phenomenon~. It 
tends, as with Fe~erbach, "to abstract from the process of hist-
ory and establish the religious(33) temperament as something in-
dependent, and to postulate an abstract ~ isolated - human indi~ 
vidual"(34)o It tends, that is, to divide society into the con-
ditioned, determined herd and the isolated, theoretically con-
scious individuals whose ideals, aims and theories are independ-
ent of the mode of life of the era, of the social demands and 
needs of the period. 
The individual theorist cannot be seen in this light; he 
must be seen in terms of his epoch. He must be seen both as its 
product and as its modifier. Just as in the individual, sensa-
tiona and intellect and the active body are related, so in society 
there is an inter-action and relation between the needs etc. of 
society impressing themselves upon the mind of the individual 
(33) Philosophic, theoretical - not religious in the narrow 
sense. 
(34) Marx, Thests on Feuerbach. No. 6. 
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and his theories and actions, through society, according to his 
theories. 
Philosophy in its earlier forms, however, has never been 
consciously revolutionary - or revolutionary at all - because it 
has never been conscious of the interdependence of theory and 
practice, between intellect and passion. It has held the view 
that thoughts are not active, but confined to the sphere of thougnt. 
As Felerbach says: "Reason unites history but passion makes it. 
Everything new therefore is an injustice against the old •••• (but) 
••• one can think without doing an injustice to anyone, without 
inflicting pain on anyone, for thoughts do not go fUrther t~n 
one's own head. But one cannot act without setting one's whole 
body in motion, without running up against obstacles on all sides, 
without pounding even against one 'a will". {35) . 
Hook comments: "Marx rejects the disjunction as being neither 
exhaustive nor exclusive. It is true that there is no action 
without .a violation of some right or interest. It is not true 
that such action need be blind, uninformed by theory or reason. 
It is tru that one can think without acting directly but it is not 
true that no injustice is thereby done. For existing injustices 
are tolerated and remain unaltered. Philosophical activity may 
be conceived as action on behalf of values and interests which 
have been criticised by knowledge and reason. The very fact that 
philosophy is an activity in a world of space and time and incom-
patible interests, makes it clear that its goals cannot be absolute 
truth or absolute Justice. But the fact that action is thoughtful 
(35) s. Hook, ''Hegel to Marx''. 1l3oC. 
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CBAPTEil III , 
,_ ____________ _ 
th• ID41•idual in societz 
Marxiea ia at bottoa a theory or huaan treecloa and 1a con-
cerned priaar11J with the eatabliehment or an order or aocietr 
in which thie treedoa wlll be attained. Marxiam ia, conaequent-
lJ, preaented w1tb the neoeaa1tJ or reaolY1ft8 the antagoniaa be-
tween the treedoa of the indi•idual, on the one hand, and the oo-
heaion and doaination or the etate, on the other. It ia rorced 
to deaonat~te the poaeibilitJ or maintaining that ••lr-identitJ 
and aoral iaportanoe or the indi•idual which, aa we have aeen, he 
aeaerta oapitaliaa to ha•• cruahed. The dominant theme in Marx • a 
aocial theory, then, 1a the individual in hia relation to hie tel-
lowe ae th•J and he are united bJ eooial bonda. To etudJ thia 
~lationahip adequatelJ we auat firat undertake an in•estigation 
into the Marxi .. theorr of the nature of human consoiouaneea, for 
thia will throw light upon the underlring preaiaee of the theory 
ot the individual. 
In hie analyaia Marx etatee the preaieea rrom which he atarta 
"are not arbitrary onea, not dogaaa, but real preaiaea troa Which 
' abatraot.iona can onlJ be aade in the iaaglnation. Th•J are real 
individuala, their aotivitJ and the aaterial conditione under 
which they 11ve, both those which they find already exiating and 
thoae produced by their activitJ ••••• •(37) And Marx aaaerta 
that men are really diatinguiehed rroa aniaale by the raot that 
(37) K. Marx and F. E~la : •aerman Ideology" p. 6 - 1. 
- 44 -
the7 produce their aeana or aubaiatenoe and in doing ao produce 
their actual aa terial life. This production ia "a definl te tora 
ot actiYitJ or ••• individua1a, a definite form ot expreaalng thelr 
lite, a definite aode of llfe on their part"; it ia not "aiaplJ ---
the reproduction of the PhJaioal existence or the individual•"• 
on the oontrarJ, it ia an expreaaion or their llfe and or what the7 
are. What individuals are depends upon and coincides with what 
th•J produce and how they produce it. "The nature or individual• 
thua depends upon the aaterial condition• determining their pro-
duction" and tbia production preauppoaes not OnlJ increased popu-, 
lation but, aore important, "the intercourse or individual• with 
one another•(38). 
Ma* atanda then in oppoaition to those theoriea(39) which 
take tor granted the domination or religion bJ regarding political,Jur~ 
1 and aoral oonaoiouaneaa aa religioua phenoaena~e. purely apirit-
ual. He repudiates the belief in the "rule or religion, or con-
. 
cepta, ot an abstract seneral principle in the exiating world". 
Such belieta •••• to Marx to be the aubatitution tor the real world 
ot phraaea and to be a Mking ot real relationships dejendent upon 
consciousness. 
With equal intensity Marx reJecta the Hegelian approach to 
Hiatory tor Hegel ia the proceas ot work-
ing out or unfolding ot a rational principle. Hegel 'a aethod ia 
hiator1oal "but he never ror~ta that the developaent which he aeta 
(38) X. Marx and F. E~ll : lbld p. 7•8 
(39) For example \hoae or the young Hegeliana, Strauaa, Stirner, 
ftuerbach, Bauer. 
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out to trace ia the development not or events or or inatitutiona, 
but or the speculative idea"(40), "History is the proceaa or 
tbe aelt-realiaation or the Absolute Idea•(41). 
Marx reject• this concept aa inadequate tor it isolates the 
prooeas or history rrom the ~al developaent or and obange within 
inatitutiona and praaotea it into aoaething aore than it is v1s. 
into a realitr above aen and things, 
Marx(42), "it 'poaaeaaea no aoloaaal riches•; 'it tights not a 
tight'. It is rather real living aan who aote; poaaesaea aDd 
tights in everrthing. It is bJ no aeana'Hietorr' which uses man 
as a aeana to oar17 out ita end a, a a it it were a person apart; 
rather Hiatorr is nothing but the activitJ or man in pursuit or 
hia enda•. Thua Marx attacks the He~lian deification or history. 
BiatorJ oan onlr be understood through an understanding or 
the or~nisation or individual• and their relation to the res\ or 
nature. lfature and men are in eonstant inter-action; historJ 1• 
the product or that inter-action: the statu• or the individual 
dependa upon the rora which that inter-action takea. The i:adi Yi• 
dual can oD17 be understood as a historical being, i.e. as a be1Q! 
who aakea h1atorr and who liYea within 1t. 
The 1ndi'Yi4ual qua historical is the individual qua social 
tor 1t is in and througb huaan intercourse that he aakea history 
aDd is atreoted bJ hiatorr. Our problea, \beeetore, 1a to deter-
aiDe whether Marxiaa postulates the aooial nature or .an. 
lAo+ V.ugban ' •atatorr ot lol1t1oa1 Pbiloaophr• p. iso. 
(41) G.D.H. Cole : •some relations between economic aDd politioal 
t.heorr" i• 29 -
(42) X. Man Repl1an PhiloaophJ ot Right" Quoted b7 0, Ruhle 
(l"arl Man) P• ., , 
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c ona 0 i ousne •• Ql soc.(ei , "~~owcno" 
To determine thie we must inveatis-te the Marxian view ot 
the llature or huan oonaoiouaneaa. It ia aa oonacioua beinp 
that we are related to our tellowa. It Marxiam holda aan'a nat-
ure to be taaicallJ social and the individual to be in a h&raonloua 
relationahip with aooiet7, it muat root theae doctrines aecurel7 
in a theor7 or oonaeiousneaa. AI isolated within •1aelt I can 
have no need tor •1 tellowa nor can I attain cooperation with thea; 
aa aharing a ooamon oonaoiouaneas I aa inter-dependent with otbera. 
Cooperation becomea poasible. To thia prpblem we must now turn. 
*Human life ia the real communlt7 or men"(43) and in their 
hu.an activities aen enter into aocial-eoonoaic, political, les-1-
relationahipa with each other in order to proluce and to aatatJ 
their needa. The origin, therefore, or aocial life liea hiatori-
oallJ in the material neceaaitiea or human individuals. No con-
tradiction ia involved here with the Ariatotelian concept that the 
state ia logioallJ prior to the taail7 and t~ the individual • 
..... "'"' Marx'a account is deliberatelJ hiatorical and it beara a cloae a1ai-
laritJ to the acoounta in both Ariatotle and Plato or the growth 
or the atate or citrC44). 
The eatabliahaent or these relationahipa ia at the same time 
the production or a form - or toraa - ot consciousness or ideas. 
For, urgea Marx, •consciouaneas can naver be anything else than 
conacioua exiatenoe, and the ••iatence of men ia their actual lite 
t43) I. Mirx z •social Aefora• Reprinted s\innins ii1eoie4 laaaya. 
(~) cr. Plato : "Republicft Bk. II and Ariatotle •Politioa• Bk. I 
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prooeaa" (45). Moreover, it ia equally vital to Marxiam that we 
muat never fors-t that tora1 ot oonaciouaneaa are interwoven with 
or burdened bJ 'material' relationlhipa, i.e. with life aa a 
vbole(46). Conac1ouaneaa 1a not independent, for "life ia not 
determined b7 oonaciouaneaa, but oonaciouaneea by life ••• the 
1t.arting point ia the real li ''iDS ind1 vidual a themsel vea, as the7 
are in actual life, and conaotouaneaa ia considered aolelJ aa 
their conaciouaneaa"(47). For Marx abandonment of empty talk 
about abstract oonaclouaneaa 11 the essential prerequisite or real 
knowledge. 
Aa we have alread7 pointed out Plato as well aa Marx treata 
the growth or society htatoricallJ. "The origin of a city •••• 
il •••• due to the tact that no one or ua ia suft1c1ant for him-
1elt but each ts in need or manr thtnga • • • • Then aen, being 
in want or many thin~a, ~ther into one settlement many partnera 
and helpera, one taking to h1aaelf one man, and another another, 
to aatiaty their deiverae needa, and to thia common aettleaent we 
give the name or city. "The city, then, ia the outcome or autual 
need1". But the first and greatest need is the provision of too4 
to aupport existence and life, the second the proviaion of a 4 .. 11• 
ing place and the third ot clothing and so on•• (48). 
Plato contlnuea by tracing the growth of the division of lab-
as he enuaerates nee4a ao he en -
bodil7, economic, enda. 
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aerat.ea the various classes required to answer thea. so aocietr 
grows. 
The a1milar1ty with the Marxian account is notable tor Marx, 
like Plato, holds that society baa ita origin in the mutual ettorts 
ot individuals to aatistr their Deeds. Social 1nat1tutiona depend 
upon the tact that the first historical act - viz. the production 
or aaterial lite itaelt - !a never completed. Harz re CO!Disea 
with Plato, that the raallJ, the division or labour and the whole 
structure ot communal life depends upon the tact that •no one or 
11 
us is autt1o1ent tor hlmaelt. 
social relationships. 
Ruaan relat1onsh1pe are, then, 
Marx glvea an important detln1t1on or 'social relationships': 
•sy social we understand the co-operation or several 1nd1v1duala, 
no aatter under what cond1t1ona, ln what manner and to what end•. 
Bearing this det1nlt1on in mind we shall now examine in more de-
tall the Marxian view or human conaciouan•••· 
Piratlr, Marx empbaalsea that conaclousneae ia never 'pure' 
but always "burdened with aatterd which makes ita appearance, in 
' 
the first instance •in the torm or agitated layers or air, aouDda, 
' 
1n abort, languase" • The study or oonactouaneaa cannot be aepa-
rated tr011 the study or language. Language, he says-, 1n praoti-
cal conaclousness expresses the social potentialities and end or 
aan. It expresses the interdependence or individuals, their 
need tor a common understanding arising froa their common needs. 
Furthermore it expresses their ability to attain mutual understand-
in&, for what, h1atoriaallf, men have done lapliea their ability 
to 4o. And tbe next iaplioation ia that to be able to I!e:ach 
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common underatandin~, autual aid meana the poaseaaion among aen 
ot a common reason, a sharing in mind. 
Language and oonsoiouaneas arise in anawer to the need tor 
1nteroourae among aen. The ex1atence or relat1onah1pa impliee a 
consciousness. Relations auat exiat "tor me"; their exiatence 
ia not purely obJeotiYe becauae there must be a conac1ouaneea or 
relation for thea to be ettective. An1aala have no coneoiouaDiaa 
hence they have not relations. "For the animal", aaya Marx, "a 
relation does not ex1at aa a relation. Conaoiousneaa" he goea 
on, "ie therefore trom the very beginning a social product and re-, 
aaina 80 as long aa men exiat at all". Conac1ouaneaa baa a bia-
torr, it 18 at r1rat a aenauoua realiaation or the immediate en-
vironment or things and peraona. It is a coneoiouaneaa or nature; 
not, however, ot nature as auoaervient or friendlJ but or nature 
as alien, aa "an all-powerful and unaaaailable force, wtth which 
' 
men'• relations are PUrelJ animal and bJ Which they are overawed 
like blaata •••••• ~(49). 
We have quoted at length in order to emphaaise Marx'• doctrine 
that consciouaneea, aa well aa aocietr, baa a hiatory and that, 
troa a primitive and aeai-aniaal oonaciouaneaa 1t developa toward• 
an underetanding or an doa1nation over nature and into a coherent 
aense ot aoc1al relat1onah1pa and obligation•. It ia in th1a pro-
ceaa that ideolog, moralitJ, law and religion emerge. 
Conaciouenaaa maturea and growa a8 the diYiaion or labour 
aprea4e, for the 4iviaion ot labour increaaea the interdependence 
tor .. n upon men, and ina.eaaea also their common intereata. The 
1mpl1ea not aerelx an allocation a1gng aep gt 
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different but qualitatively siailar occupations and duties, but 
also the separation or material or PhJsical and mental labour. 
With this latter division there arises in conaciousneas itaelt 
the "conaoiousneaa oonac1oua of itaelt"; the idea that oonac!oua-
neaa and ideas and, indeed, all thinking ia independent and 'pure'. 
Consciousness is not seen as related to and dependent upon physi-
cal life but as a thing-in-itaelf, the contents of which are not 
derived fraa natural or material neotasity. Thus, says Marx, are 
created " 'Pure•, theory. theolOgJ, philosophy, ethics, etc." Ho 
-
aatter how emancipated this theor1 appears from the 'material' 
' 
world, it conflicts with that world whenever contradictions arise 
in the sphere of social relationahips. 
These social contradictions are the outcome or development• 
1n "torces• of a productive system which have not bean followed 
b7 a parallel and neoeaaary adJustment in what Marx calla the "soc-
ial relatione of production". Such contradictions within societ7 
are rooted in the division of labour and the clash of interests 
between individuals. 
Marxism, is fundamentally, a historical philosoph7 and Marx 
bases his interpretation or man and society upon preaisea which 
postulates their essential unity. He repucliated that outlook 
which derived ita doctrines from something called the "essence of 
.. n" as something beyond society. as the embodiment of which each 
isolated individual existed. Such a doctrine seemed to Marx an 
unreal abstraction froa the process of history and the postulation 
an4 glorification of -an abstract and isolated human ind1vidualH(5°+. 
tso) ot. Marx'• "fheel• on reuerbaeh• 6 ana 7. 
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different but qualltativelJ aiallar occupations and dut1ea, but 
a lao the aeparat1on or material or phyaice.l and mental labour. 
With this latter division there arlaea 1n conactouaneaa 1taelt 
the "oonaoiousneaa conac1oua ot itaelt"J the idea tba\ oonactoua-
neaa and ideas and, indeed, all thinking ia independent and 'pure'. 
Consciousness is not seen aa related to and dependent upon physi-
cal life but aa a thing-ln-itaelf, the contents of which are not 
derived rroa natural or material nectaaltJ. Thua, aays Marx, are 
created " 'Pure', theory, theolOgJ, philosophy, ethics, etc.• Ko 
-
aatter how emancipated thla theory appears from the •material' 
world, it conflict& with that world whenever contradictions arlee 
in the aphere or aocial relationahlpa. 
These social contradictions are the outcome or development• 
in Hrorcea" of a productive ayatem which have not bean followed 
07 a parallel and neceaaary adJustment in what Marx calla the "aoc-
1al relatione of production". Such contradictions within eoo1etr 
are rooted ln the dlvlalon or labour and the clash or lntereata 
between lndlvlduale. 
Marxism, is fundamentallJ, a hiatorioal philosophJ and Marx 
baaea hia interpretation ot man and aooietr upon preaiaea which 
poatulatea their eaaentlal unity. He repudiated that outlook 
which derived ita doctrine• troa aomething called the "eaaenoe ot 
aan" aa aomething beyond aociety. aa the embodiment of which each 
isolated individual exiated. Such a doctrine seemed to Marx an 
unreal abatraotion froa the prooeaa or h1etorr and the poatulation 
and glorlflcat1on of •an abatraot and 1aolated human lndlvl4ual"(5°~. 
lSO) of. Marx 1a "fheala on Peuerbaeh• 6 and 7. 
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Furthermore, this approach aeeas to make the human essence mean-
ingless bJ reducing it to a senerality "which naturally unites the 
maJ:V 1ndiYiduala". The indiYidual cannot be thus reduced to a 
permanent and unchanging collection or qualities, for the iD4iYi-
dual and aocietJ are related not in a static existence but in a 
dJD&mic, changing movement. 
Marx 1na1sta that we study the phenomenon ot consciousness 
as exemplifying the social nature of man. Much light may be 
thrown upon thia doctrine bJ a comparison, to which we shall short-
ly turn, with the Idealist account or the phenomenon of oonscioua• 
' 
ness. 
Marx and Idealism 
We have seen that for Marx the mutual dependence of man upon man -
the common needs of men and their co-operation in satisfying these 
needs - is the historical preaupposition for the development ot 
consciousness and language. Marx ia, therefore, taking a view 
which waa not possible for the earlier materialists. On their 
premises and in terms of their method, individuals were atomiatioal-
ly isolat.ed. Marx atanda opposed not only to the shattering and 
diaaatrous dualiam ot Deaoartes but also to the cult or ind1v1d-
ual1sm which developed with this du&liem(51). 
In Marx's theory of cognition, knowledge and consciousness we 
(51) See Chapter II, above. 
are not placed in \be ego-ccatric position or thinkers tor whoa 
the priaarr question tor pbilosophJ or religion is the nature ot 
the self and its knowledge and juatiticatlon. We are not asked 
bJ Marx to answer as the sole important question in ethica: "How 
am I Justified?" or in epietomologrz "How do I know?" tor Marx 
there ia no .. x• apart trOll •xou•. 
The verr concepts cannot be separated or isolated troa each 
other, tor they involve each other. The dialectical position or 
the inter-dependence or opposites is here well illustrated. The 
verr act or separation of the ideas 'I' and 'You' involves the 
' 
notion that the7 cannot be aeparat.ed(52). But such apparentlJ 
abstract losical observationa aust not lead to a forgetting or 
their ground in the totalitJ of common needs and productive etrort 
• in short, in common experience. The social "world~ of produc-
tion and material necessity is temporally prior to the conscious 
recognition or social interdependence. Ror may we reduce this 
basic interdependence to biology - reproduction and production • 
tor the totality of social relationships is more than these; it 
is a totality or a whole or aaterial and ideal relationships - a 
oosmunitJ of action, co-operation and conflict. And it is from 
such common, joint action that social consciousness •• in indivi-
dual minds !rows, and it is by the possibility for such Joint acti-
vitJ that the social nature or man is proved. 
The very idea or the 1ntelligibilitJ or things and other men 
(51} "Since he comes into the world with a looking glass in his biii 
•••• aan first sees s.nd recosnises hiaselt in other men. .Peter OnlJ 
establishes hie own identitJ by comparing himself with Paul as a bel~ 
ot a like kind. And therebJ Paul, just ae he stands in h1a Paulia. 
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preauppoaea c011mon action in a world which we hold in couon. 
This was a truth unknown to the early materialiataC53) and sen• 
aationalista(54), for they postulated isolated individuals re-
oe1v1ng aeparatelJ distinct "impressions". The concept of '1m-
preee1ona received' as constituting knowledge makes human con-
sciousneaa paaa1ve; it -.oomea a oonsoiousneas or individual 
pleaaure or pain, gain or loas. A passive individualism in ep-
iatomology beoomea in the field of aoctal action the doctrine ot 
hedonistic eeif-interest; whereas with Marx the social foUD4at1ona 
ot ooneciousneas beoome an assertion of the active r&le of men 
in both the ~1n1ng and the application of knowledge. 
These Marxist principles may be integra ted with the Idealist 
tradition, aa we remarked above, and this integration and coapari• 
son is or value to our proalem in that it illustrates the persis• 
tently maintained idealism of Marxian "dialectical materialism" 
and the roots of .Marx:'-• theory of the individual. For the purposes 
of our analysis we might study an7 of t.he recent Idealist thinkers 
- Bradley, Boaanquet, Collingwood etc. 
concentrate on F.B. BradleJ. 
Let us for the moment. 
Bradley 1n an eaaar(55) on political morality poses the point 
of Yiew that to hold that the state is prior to the individual and 
that the whole &• Sl!&ter than the sum of ita parts 1s an 1lluaioD 
personalitJ, beoomea to Peter the type ot the genus homo" (K. Mars, 
Capital 1,6. Quoted s. Hook : ~rowarda the understanding or Karl 
.Marx). 
(53} Por exa•ple Hobbes. 
(54 ) Locke, lilua • 
(55) lP .B. Bradle7 : •M7 Station and its Duties" Chapter V, 
•Ethical Studies~, Oxford UniversitJ Preas. 
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that •baa been traced to 1 ta aouroe and d1apelled ••••• exploded". 
Tbe taailJ, aoc1etJ, the s~ate and generallJ everr oommun!t7 ot 
men, th1a 1 refu~t1on' goes on, 1a real onlJ in ita indi•idual 
aeabera, for onlJ theJ have real existence. TheJ are the produota 
of individuals' aoti•1tJ and theJ peraiat onl7 because indi•iduala 
continue to stand in certain relations to each other. These in-
41viduala aa~ these relatione, and, although they are real !B 
them, thia does not •an that th&J are real beoauae of t.hem or 
that the7 would not be real ~ of them. This point or view 
holda, in short, that ~ community"1s the sum of its partP-, is made 
' 
bJ the addition of parte; and that the parts are as real before 
the addition as after; the relations they stand in ••••• are ao .. 
cident.al, not ea E:ent.1al to their being"; that 1s, indi viet.uala are 
the facta of aocial phenomena and·aocietiea are collection• ot 
auch 1Dd1viduala held together bJ "force, illusion or contract•. 
BradleJ proceeda to attack this doctrine holding that such 1D• 
d1v1duala &8 the theor7 poatulatea do not in fact exiat and that 
individual& are what th•J are bJ •1rtue of their atatue in a ooa-
munitJ, bJ virtue, indeed, of the ver1 existence of a co .. unitJ. 
Oommunit1ea are not mere namee but they are real and a real unitJ, 
aomething more than the agsres-t• or their members. If we re-
move from a man hie background, his tradition, hie education, hie 
ouetoma, h~ habit&, h1a socially formed and moulded oharaoter1at1on 
the rea1~ua is aometh1ns that never existed nor e?er can. The 
'Ver7 eaaeno•·or the individual ia deatroyed if .... auppoae the worl4 
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isolated individual is a t1ct1on; tor the 'individual' who doea 
not possess as a part or h1a relat1ona with others and the poten-
t1a11t7 for these relat1ona, who does not attain self•real1sat1on 
aDd selt•underatand1ng can not be. •Man", says BradleJ, "waa 
never anrthing but aoo1al, and aoc1et7 waa never made by 1n41v1d• 
ual man; the 'individual' apart troa the aOJIDlunl tr 1a an abstrac-
tion". 
BradleJ'a toraula, that aan is social and that hie coneclous-
neaa ia socially cond1t1oned(5&), does not, however, solve all the 
problema that arlee in tb11 eonnect1Qn. ' Ite general principle 
has still to overcome the existence within society 1taelf or those 
contradictions ·and d1v1e1ona which Marx sought to analyse and N• 
late to the life and future or the individual. 
Later work by philosophers of the Idealist school pree~t a 
more detailed and complete approach to the problem.C57). 
It is agreed that there ex1at within society elements hostile 
to true aooial lite. Society it is correctly affirmed is in a 
state of tension between the tendenc1eato social integration on the 
one har~ and tendencies inimical to the formation or a complete 
aocietJ ae opposed to a mere community. 
T.ftl'!OUgh speech, 1t is agreed, man 'liberates himself' from 
blind acceptance ot and domination b7 desires, paes1ona and 1nat1ncta 
{56) •When he (the 1nd1vld.ual) can aeparate himself from (the) world 
and know b1aself apart from 1~. then by that time h1a aelt, the 
obJect or his self-consciousness, ie penetrated, infected, cbar-
aoterized by the existence of othera. Its content 1apl1es everJ 
fibre ot the coamun1t7." F.H. BradleJ Etb. st. p. 112. 
(57) R.G. Coll1ngwood'a n.Hew.IAv1atban" illuatretes the modern Ideal• 
1st approach to the problea. 
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and equally from fear or and aubJection to bllnd natural foro••· 
Eaaent1ally, the first atep in auoh liberation la the naming or 
or the defining and reoogniain@ of that which muat be oontrolle4. 
Thia proceaa of naming is the proceaa or attaining intellectual 
maturity. Xaming is bringing something into conaciouanaas; it la 
the ~ery basia of thinking. And language is the prerequia1ie ot 
thought. and, hence, or knowledge. Language, therer'ore, ia the 
expression or conac1ouaneaa. It la, in ita s1mpleat tora, the 
mere regiater of teelin~a; as auch lt ia wild, unorganiaed. Aa 
conaeiouaneaa becomes coherent, language de.elops. 
Juat as paaaiona ha•e as their obJect something not ot the 
aelt which poaaeaaea the paaaion, so elementary social oonao1oua-
neaa or which langua~ ia the expreaa1on, reate upon the d1at1nct1on 
between the 'self' and the 'not-self'; 'my will' is a oorre~lat1~• 
idea to the 11dea or another'• will'. "Roman has an idea or hia-
aelt' as a tree agent, without an idea ot free agents other than hia• 
aelt' and or aoctal relationa between tbea"(58). A Joint or social 
act.i•it.J impliea a social conac1ouaneas, lansuage, as th~ expreaa-
1oD ot that consciousness, is the expreaa1on ot the human urge to 
tultllment in society. 
Since a true society can onlJ be baaed upon relatione between 
f~•• aen • and hence 1a not a mere 'collection' • 1t implies a aut-
tic1ent measure or equality to promote the execution of Joint pur-
poses. Societ7 reata upon the existenc•, it 1e held, of a Joint 
will; that comaun!tz ia not aoctal in which no Joint will ex11ta &D4 
(58) R.G. Coll1ngrtood t JI•Jt Lev1atban Chap XXI 
j 
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and in which Joint action 1a the result not or mutual dea1a1on 
but or :force. Thus there exist, not as mutuallJ exclusive ent1-
tiea 'aoc1etiea' and what have been termed 'non-social commun1t1ea•. 
The former are tree, baaed upon a social will; the latter are 
sere collections held tosether by force. 
the same oommun1t1es. 
They co-exist w1 thin 
this analysis 1a close to that or Msrx :for it recognise& bOth 
the non-coherence of existing society and it goea on to hold tbat 
the existing contradio\iona (the olaaa roots of which it ralls to 
recognise) aay be removed. 
It 1a basic to the I4eal1at argument that a society should 
be ''self-ruling". All ita dec1a1oDa and rules should be the apon-
taneoua dec1e1on of the social whole; they should not be ~he iapoaed 
~eciaiona or a group. Ever7 existing society contains elements 
or the non-social community; i.e. it is ruled both by force and 
imposed decision and oy tree Joint social will. 
Society does not exist ataticallf• for both Marx and the Ideal-
lata society!! not; it 1& 'becoming'. For the Idealists tbe 
prooeas in society is that or the absorption of the non-aoo1al coa-
munity into the social - i.e. the bringing int~ the commun1~1 ot 
the intellectually mature (the social community), those who are in-
1m-
telleo~ually u ture and w·ho are dependent upon and hence ruled bJ 
A 
the intellectuallJ aatureC59). 
ibua for Idealiam, whllat every society involves the 1d*& ot 
(59) The 'intellectually mature' society 1a baaed upon the idea ot 
~he 'we' not merel7 abstractly but concretely • 'we• dec1de to aot. 
The '1ntellectuallJ immature' have no deep oonaciouaneaa or ~e •we•. 
r 
' 
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a UDiveraal aoo1al comaunity - i.e. the eliaination of non-social 
eleaenta within society - every exiatin~ aociet1 is but part1all7 
aooial, hence aelf-contradiotory both in ita internal and external .,S".,, 
aapecta. It ia, that isA divided internall7 into aoc1al and non-
aocial communities and externallJ 1t ia aelf-contradictory beoauae 
it ia a particular and not a universal society. And the idea or 
aociety 1a bound up with the idea or univeraality. Societ7, tor 
the Idealiata, tnvolvea an all-embracing integration with univeraal 
reason; the individual becomes a whole within that .. acral orsan!.am• 
ot the universal aociet7(60). 
J'undam.entally, Marx aasociataa himaelt' with thaee prtnciplea 
but his theory tnvolvaa certain ditferencea which it baa been our 
purpoae to brtn~ otat in thia co11pariaon ot urxtam and Idealiam. 
We have seen that for Idealtam the society tn which the individual 
livea ia an expreaaion or hie social nature. But Idealism baa 
ahawn, too, that thta society is neither static nor truly social. 
Marx develope these views. He analreea the nature or tbe non-aocial 
elementa and tendenciea in eociety an~ he claritiea the individual~ 
relation to them. 
ror Marx the individual could not be aeen apart trom aooiet71 
hie conactouaneea is a social conacioueneaa. But it ia social be-
cause the individual ie a particular relationahip to aoo1et7 and 
hia conaciouan••• ia not, aa we have eeen, 'pure' or independent or 
conditions of ex1atence. 
(60) !he phrase is Bradley's cf. Eth. Studiee op cit Ch. V 
• 
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"It is not mene' consciousness which determines their exlatM 
enoe; on the contrary it la their social exlatence that determine& 
their oonac1ouanaaaC6l)H. Marx holds that the degree to vh1oh 
tree will 1s operattve in society - i.e. the degree of truly aoc-
1al conec1ousness - and the content of that conaciousnesa are de• 
pendant upon the sootal relationships of the individual. Th••• 
relationships are independent ot mens' will. They c ona t.l tute the 
economic etructure or system under wh1ch they live, into which, 
very largely. they are born. It is in the clashes and contrad1o-
tiona w1th1n this eyetem of relat1onah1ps t~t we find the source 
ot the develoP~ent of consclouanese and tb.e origin or the movement 
or aoolety. 
The development or social conaotousness may be traced in thia 
aovement 1n the 'material' conditions of eocietJ(62). It ia a 
prooeaa or the elim1natioh o.f contradictions both in th+wun con-
actouaneas and in the community itself. This consciousneaa wh1lat it 
1• not blindly determined by economic developments, it ia relative• 
ly independent, reacting upon aooietJ. 
ad and. 11mi ted. 
It is. for ~rx, condition-
We have reached the pos~ion, then, that the individual 1a poa-
aesae4 by nature of a consciousness aooially conditioned and aould-
ed and ia, therefore, potentiallJ a member of a truly aoc1al (i.e. 
integrated, non-contradictory) community. He is not a meaNr ot 
Tli) I.Harx : Introduction to "critique of Political Econoay*. 
(62) The development or the social consciousness in Marx oorreapOD4a 
to Lhe concept or beooain! aocial 1n the Idealists. 
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such a community, however, by virtue or the tact that all exist-
ing coamun1ties are torn by conflicts. The individual is caught 
in a aaze or contradictions - between individual interest and 'the 
general good', between class advantage and rival class pressure, 
between stability and social prosre••• between rich and poor -
Which make his aocial consciousness a olasa conaciouaneaa and hie 
role in the aoc1alia1ng or hu.an conac1ouaness a revolutiouary on.. 
We auat, therefore, exaaia. the problem or social contrad1ct1o~a 
they affect the individual. 
Individual and social contradict1ona 1 
The main presupposition for Marx in any study of what he term-
ed the 'pre-historic stage of human history(63)•, is the fact ot 
the property relations based upon the division of labour within 
'clvil ~oc1ety•(64). 
Ths processes or bour~oia civil society conflict with the 
very nature of aoc1e.l consciousneaa. A society and a social con-
ec1oueness involves, as we have seen, a social will, a common aoc-
1el re~son and, hence, a Joint purpose. Xhe 1nd1vidual becom•• a 
social b4t1ng when his interests and purposes are those of soo1etr 
as a whole. The individual's purpoeea must be coherent and con-
s1stent w1th thoee of Roc1ety. Iet this do•s not occur in bourg-
eo1s soctety. Man, as Marx pointed out in his Critique of the 
Hee!li!n Philoaophz or R1~tC65), is not an abstract being blxop4 
(63) By thla Marx meane the hi1tory of all olaa& societ1ea, i.e. all 
history to date. 
(64) 'Civil society' "The true hea•~ and \hea\re of all hlatorr 
" I 
.. 61 -
the world, outside or contact w1th 1ta problema. Man muat be 
aeen 1n hie true context in •the world or men•, i.e. 1n the etate 
or aoc1etr. But the world v1ew, the outlook, which current aoo-
ietr and the State promotee are dietorted and perverted preciaelJ 
because the state and aoc1etr are per.erted and eelt-destruct1ve. 
Society 1e divided into olaaaee, each having ita own particu-
lar interests over and asainat the intereeta or societr as a whole. 
Zaoh successive eooiety - feudal, bourgeois, proletarian - t.aglnes 
that it and 1ts predaal~nt ideology represent the culmination or 
social progress e.nd ·~ tl'\ouF-Jlt. Eech imagine that the intereata or 
the part1.cular ruling class represent the general 1ntereat of all 
EOci&ty and of all elasees. But this ie not the oa~e, tor claaa• 
ee etand in the relation or oppreesed and oppressors. The exist-
ence or an oppressed cl~ss 1s fundamental to all class soc1ety(66). 
Each olsss-eoc1ety contains within 1t thle elaah of interest and 
in its rise to power e&ch new ruling claa8 brin~s into existence a 
claee with whose interests it 1s in eonf11et. Even 1f each member 
ot a ruling clase 1a united with every other ln support or elaaa 
inter~sta, each 1s by virtue of that tact united with every other 
is not the poll tical world but c1 v{l eoc1e·t.y. The phraae •••• orl• 
gtnated 1n the 18th century. Civil society has the family with its 
developments and external relatione ae hesis. It begins to have a 
regular development with the r1.ae or the bourgeoisie which is, in the 
18th century the potential, 1n the 19th century the actual, ruling 
claae. 01vil aocietr ia the social orsaniaation which evolves d1rN 
ectly out of production and commerce, and forma the baa1a or the 
a tate and all other idealistic aul)4tret.ructure". L.P. Adame "J:arl 
Marx 1n his earlier writtnge". 
( 65) Q.uot.ed o. Ruhle' 1 "larl Marx" • 
('6)1. Marx. ~The Poverty of Philosophy" P• 189. 
-
1n conflict with the antagonistic, conflicting interests or the 
claas they oppress. 6 Tbia opposition or interests tlowe from 
the econoa1c condition~ or bour~oia lite"(67). 
But the mere division of interests between classes 1s not 
the sole contradiction within aoo1ety. The individual, 1n his 
r&le aa olaas aeaber. la involved in claahee of interests and pur• 
poses with other individuals or groupe or individuals. 
says Marx. it becomes clear that bourgeois relations or product-
ion are not simple in character but 4ual(68). Marx meane that 
not only do these relatione produce wealth, they also produce pov-
erty. 
Within the bourgeois wcrld• then, we find the d1via1on of in-
dividuals bn the baeia of their particular interests. This con-
flict manifests itself 1n the phenomenon of competition. This 
competition between men - "tree oompet1t1on~ - is the sole regula-
t1ve authority in bour~oia society. Ooapetttion involves a mut-
ual boatility of intereate among meabera of the bourgeoisie 1taalr(6f). 
These eontradictiona within aoclety are inimical to the pro-
duction or social eoheeton and a conac1ou1neaa of the interests and 
true nature of eociety. They produce breakdowns ln the emo~th 
tunctiontns or the material production in aociety. This involvea 
the necessity or changing aoctal relatione. A revolutionary situ-
atlon la created. fh_!_rule of the bo~geoia1e_lnstee~ of promot1D6 
~K. MPrx : Ibid p. 1}3•4 
(68) X. Marx : Ibid p. 1J9 
(69) "The bourgeoisie find& itself involved in constant battle ••• wl\h 
those portions or the bour~ois1e itself, whose 1nteresta have become 
an&&sonist1c to the irogrees or industr7" : K. Mbrx and F. En~la 
*communist Manifesto p. 215 Selected Works of K. Marx. 
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e&aJ change 1n aooiet1 pauperizes th8 proletariat and ao, beoauae 
ot ita 1D&bil1\J to rule, tbe bourgeoisie - vh1oh ~cannot aaaure 
to ita alavea a alave'a exia\ence~(70) • ia an4 auat be oballease4 
and. o?erthrcnm as a olaaa. 
Such a a1tuat1on or revolattoD&rJ need and act1v1tJ oreatea 
tor the individual or whatever the olaaa the neoaaa1tJ tor the 4e-
velop .. nt ot a olaaa conaolouaneaa. 
Olaaa Oonacloua~ 
Cl~sa coneciousneaa, as we aball see, 11 the sole rorm ot aoclal 
' 
eoneaiouenee~ which lt la poaaible ror 1ncUv1dual& to develop with-
in olaee society. Ita dar1vat1on ana lmportanee for our lnvee\i• 
gat1on suet now be considered, for it 1a a class member that Marx 
an&lJses the 1nd1v1dual 1n society and lt 1s the abolition or the 
alase characterist1ca at which he alma. 
CommonlY' 1 t 1a accepted that man become a a thinking being a a 
a ~eult of aoclal llte and the pressure or social needs. Marx'• 
po~ton is that reason 1e the outcome or practical necesa1tJ and 
hie doct::-1ne, agatn, 1s larg8ly that or ·t.he Ideallat aohool - with 
the dlffer~nce that Marx relates the 'praet1cal' a~urcea ot reaaoa 
to the elase s t.ruoture of soc1.et7(71). 
We, as human, think rat1onallJ primarily as a reault ~~ prao-
t1osl ~ee~s - to facilitate dolnE! and to explAin one actiona to our-
aelvea. Thua raaeon ts first concerned wtth the ego and ita ac\1-
---------------------·----------------
(70) Ibid p. 218 
(71) ct. F.G. Collin~ood Maew Leviathan" Cbap. 18 
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v1tiea. Aa reaaon begine to conaider queationa about other 
thing• it becomes "theoret1oal ... But, aa Marx alao points out, 
auoh theoretical ~nking 11 never purely theoretical. It baa 
ita roota in neede, in practice or in practical problema concern-
1ng relation• wtth otbera. Further, even theoretical th1nk1ns 
muat bt teated by and derived from practical activitiel. All th1Dk• 
1ns • no utter how 'theoretical' • 1a root.e(!l 1n practical proD-
lema. Alternatively we might expreaa the aame idea, as Harz did, 
by seeing theoretical thinking aa derivative from the ruat~rial pro-
duotlve activity or human aoo1ety. II "Fbtal th1nk1n& eays 11. G. 
-
Collingwood•, ia alwaya to aoae extent experimental 1n 1ta metboda1 
it &lY&J• starts from practice and returns to praot1ce; for 1t. 
1e b&aed upon 'intereat' in the thing thought about; that ia QD 
a practical oonoern with it"(72). 
PUrthermore, it 1s fundamental to Marxism that man der1vea 
hh conoolouln .. • - l,e, hto theor,.t1oal refleft ve aettv1t1es • 
t~o. hia praot1oal aooial aot1v1ty~ia work. The problems with 
wh1oh san 11 raced are practical; they oannot be solved passlvelJ. 
Nan, ror Marx, 1a a being who creates hla world. He builds th1a 
world through hie work and in doin~ eo, he t>utlds h1e oonso1ouaneaa 
and determinee 1ta contents and form. Marx's consciousness and 
h1a theoreticsl thinking 1a determined by his work as ~ memoer or 
a olaas wtth1n a aooiety. 
thus, the oonac1ouaneea of each individual depends upon the 
practical problema - the interests - of each 1ndivtdual. 
(12) R. G. Coll1ngwoo4 op cit. 
- 65 ... 
aDd eYerJ olaee or aen will have a different theoretical attitude 
aooord1n8 to the 41tterent practical problema with wh1ch he or 
they are raoe4. 
Marx deyelopa thia doctrine b7 pointing out that certain pre-
doa1nat1n« 1ntereata baaed upon propert7 relations ~nd reeult1ng 
power d1atr1bution are the aource ot poll tical .. and, 1ndee4, all 
theoretical - thinkin~. fhe oonaoiouaneaa or anr given period 
1a 4er1•ed from olaaa-1ntereata and predomiM.nt uterial iudivid-
ual 1ntereata. 
Claaa-conaotouaneaa ia, therefore, not merely the recognition 
of aof1al life trom a partial aapeot; 1t te the whole range of 
thooret1cal (ideological, rel1stoua, economic and ph1loeoph1cal) 
a~t1tudea preva1ling among certain groupa.ot people at certain per-
iods. ~rx holds with others that eueh attitudes are social ~ro-
duct.a. It ts the conecioueneea or 'we' {a class {_lroupf. n.Jt tbat 
or 'I' or 'we' (aa a aoo1al whole). It ta a recognition or group 
neede and purposes. Social oonaoiouenees ia not, th&refore, 'pure' 
conaciouaneaa, it ts burdened with 'practice' or with 'matter'. 
For Karx thia means ~hat 1n every epoch there are aertatn pre-
do11ina ting doctrines, ''ruling ideae". These idees are thoee hel4 
and propagated by the ruling cl&aa, that olasa which b6e et 1te die-
posal tbe means or material production. These 1deae are •nothing 
more than ~he ideal expression of the dominant materi~l relat1on-
ab1ps, the dOIB1nant material relst1oneh1pl grasped ae idee.e (7' }• • 
And the ruling claaa' influence d.oa1na tea not only Ill& terlal rela t1on• 
(7l) I. Jlarx and F. Engels : .. Geruaan Ideol08J't p. 39 
- '' . 
ahlpa but equallJ the 1deolog1oal life or an epoch. 
The d1Y1a1oa ot labour take& on a new :"orm. The production 
ot ideaa beco•• a apeclal •oca tton. Ment.a.l and materte.l labour, 
\hinkera and thoBe receptive to 1deaa - theee ere the new d1oho-
tem1ea ot olaaa aocietr. 
We auat ndt, however, two laporta.nt qualif1ca.t1ona of t.h1a 
doctrine. 
1) Olaaa-conactouaaeaa, in the form ot olaea-tdeologies, 1& 
Such claee-consc1oua-
neea,M&rx claims, 1a to be round •• auch only,in the revclut1onarJ 
proletll.rie.t when it. recognises 1 t.aelf llfl apaet from the rert of 
societJ and yet a~: the olaaa whose 1ntereate ul ttlJla te ly coincide 
with those or society aa a whole. All other class-ideology lma-
Alnaa 1t.eelf to be representative of ~nerel 1ntortH~t and as ·t.he 
expression of aoo1ety as a whole. 
2) Ldeaa are not considered by Marx to be·mere ep1~henowe~. 
The7 are the produot.a of 1nd1v1duals' minds which are derived fraa, 
cono~rned with and limited by1 preva1l1ns material conditions. 
Jfafx is concerned pr1ur11y to d1acred1t the doctrine that h1etorJ 
1a ~he unfolding of the 14••· He is not concern•G to d1ecr·ed1t 
the role uf the lnd1v1dual 1n history nor to Oeny the effect ot 
1deoloSY upon historical development. 
'.l.he 1nd1v1dital theor1at 1a not, however, a. phenomenon wbioh 
Karx trea~e clearly. He 1s certe.1nlJ not a being 1eolat!l<! rrom. 
h1a rellowe, nor 11 ne merely tbe ~outhp1ece or & cl&aa. He C&ll 
----------------------------------------------------
(73) J:.Marx and ?. Engels : "German Ideology" p. 39 
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ablpa but equallJ the ideol~e1oal life of an •poch. 
The division ot labour takea on a new ~orm. The production 
ot ldeae be co•• a special •oca t1on. Mental and. materia.l labour, 
\binkera and tho•• receptive to 1deaa - theee ere the new d1oho-
teaiea ot claaa aocietr. 
We auet n~, however, two 1aportant qual1f1oationa or this 
4ootr1ne. 
1) Claea-oonaeioueneaa, in the form ot olasa-tdeologies, 11 
not aelt-conaoioua !I claaa-oonaoiouaDaaa. SUch claee-coneotoua-
neaa,Marx cla1ma, 1a to be round aa aueh only,ln thP revclut1onarJ 
prol•t..ria.t when 1t recognises 1t.ae1f 8! apaet rrorn the r••t ot 
societJ and y&t au the olaaa whose 1ntereats ul tlma te ly coincide 
with thoa• of society aa a whole. All otl~r class-ideology 1m&-
&1:P.il 1t.eelf tO be representative Of ~enerel 1ntortHllt !ind as the 
expression of aooiety as a whole. 
2) ldeaa are not considered bJ Marx to be·mer~ ep1~henowe~. 
fhe1 are the produc"a Of ind1 V1duals' m1nde Whtch 8. re •.Jeri ved froa, 
cono~rned with and 11m1ted by1 preva111ns material conditions. 
Jtafx 1& concerned pr1ur1ly to d1aored1t the doctrine that h1etorr 
1a ~he unfolding o:r t.he Ic!aa. He ie not concern&c to discr·ed1t 
ths role of the lnd1vidual 1n history nor to 6eny ths effect or 
ideology upon historical development. 
'lhe 1nd1v1dual theor1at 1a not, however, a phenomenon wh1oh 
Karx trea~e clearly. He 11 certs.1nlJ not a being 1solat~<! from. 
h1a fellows, nor 1a h.e merely the ;aouthp1ece or a class. He caa 
(7}.) I.Karx and ?. Engels : "aerun Ioeologyli p. 39 
" r .. 
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lead and create op1Dlon, he can moul4 oonaoloaaneaa • Hla 1deaa, 
boweYer, are neYer ao tar 41Toroe4 troa current problema or pre-
va111Dl doctrlnea. He cannot tomtnate aociety or hia claaa, .aaYe 
aa a apokeaaan or bia claaa. 01'1 the other band be doea not mer.-
17 reflect eventa. be retleota JR2D t~a. Be doea not merelJ 
juatitJ, be influences and ta 1ntluencea bJ aocial condition.. He 
ta, in abort, conditioned not 4etera1ned; limited in h1a treedoa, 
not obalned to events. Claaa lnt~reats 4oa1nate 1nd1v1duals, but 
ther can, as 1deolog1ata. recognise their liaitln~ effee-• and th•J 
can partially liberate themaelvea and become aore truly social by 
asaoo1at1n0 themselves, as 1nd1v1dusla, w1th,other more progreaa1ve 
claeees. .tnd1v1duala, however, can never 11oere.te thellselvee rroa 
the tact and domination ot claas-d1v1m1on. 
'l'he wffect.a ot theee cHviatona upon individuals have been sua-
aed up bJ #iar·x aa follows: 
11 lndlvicbaala have always b'-Jllt on themselves, but naturally 
on themselvea wit.hln their glyen h1ator1oal oon41t1ona and rel&tiOD• 
shipa, not on t.he •pure' 1nd1v1duals 1n the sensa or 1deolog1sta. 
But. 1n the course of h1ator1oal evolutton and preo1sely through 
the inevitable fact that wtth1n the d1v111on or labour sootal re-
lat1oneh1pa t6.k.e on an lndepen<!.ent ex1at.enc•, there appears a divt-
eion within the life of each lndivl~ual in 80 rar •• 1t la ~raonal 
and in so far aa it 18 determined bJ eome branch or labour and 
oondl tions pert111n1ng to 1 t''. 
Not that. man 1e merely hia soe1a.l function; rat.ber their ~r­
aonal1t1ea are condtioned and detex~1ned by claaa ralat1onah1pe and, 
therefore, they.eutter from the d1v1a1ona 1n and between olaaeea in 
~ .. \ •.-----.---_______ _:_ ___ ..'""", •. - •.• -..... -:.;;-.: -.• ,.-. 8t--.:-,; .._-.~,---; -. _- ~-- - ------
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their ~reonal and private 11vee e.e 1nd1vidue.ls. The lifEj of a.n 
1nd1v1dual 1n the bourgeoisie, is moreover, threet"Sned by that d1'f1• 
a1on between the personal and olaae individual produced by the doc-
trine and praat1ee of compet1t1on. This division is peculiar to 
the drnaraic and moving bourgeola soclet-1 rather than to the at.at1o 
h1ererob1cal aoc1ety of the medieval era. Under bourgeo1a 'civil 
aooiety•, society becomes baaed upon" a war of all asatnat all". 
fhe 1ncUv1dual proletarian 1• compelled, as s. ::'eeult of tn1s 
tact, to develop h1a potent1al1tiea !! ~ Rroletarlan, 1.o. to be-
come revolutionary a.n\1 aaaert himself ee an lnd 1 vidual - i.e. a a 
' 
a being whose pri~ry desire is to oecome part of a lerger social 
whole - and as a proletarian - i.e. ae a claas 1ncivldual. 
We ~ve sean then tnat a) the individual in olaae society 
1e primarily social but hta tiooial nature expresesa itself on11 
part.1all1 aa olaaa-oonsciouanees and in class loyal tiee lind. t'Etbs.V-
iour: 
b) '!his class chfl.rs..ctl!r is t~l-;) re-
sult or the cont.radtct1ons w'\.thln soolety which tna lndlvtdual re-
flects 1n the contred1cttona 1n hie ovn nature - as person and as 
class individual. 
c) Although as thinkers indiv1.:5uals 
may attec t. class actions or repud1at• olase allegianc~ ti·1ey ce.rmot 
divorce the£selves from class division. ThGy must ret:resent some 
olaaa - t.e. limited - point of view, einoe under class sooiet1 no 
genaral,. all-embrac1n~ view point 1e possible. 






\ar1at which, DJ proaot.1n! 1 ta class interests, promote a general 
hu.an welfare bJ at.ruggllns t'or a reorge.nlas. tl on or hUllla.n e oclet.r. 
and the reao~al or social contrad1ct1ona, can the 1nd1v1dual pro-
mote h1s own true social nature and that or hla fellows; 
e) v~rx1sm holds, therefore~ a thecrr 
4t the nature and source or oonsc1ouanesa and hurnsn n&ture an~ of 
~e 1ndlv1dual in relation to these vhlch differs not at all run-
4amen1.&11J from Idealist. doatr1~a. Both rest. u_;,on the · .. m1 verRa-
11t1 at human ~aeon and aoc1ab1lity. It 1e as revolut1onatx that. 
Marxism differs trom Ideallem. 
It ls to th1a aspect or l~rx1s~ and 1te theory or the 1nd1· 
vidual, that we muat turn. We shall exe mine t 'he nature of the 
soo1al goal or 1d.eal eoo1ety purpo!.ed oy l'~srx er.Cl t:e shall sst:~ bow 
hle analya1a of the relation of 1nd1v1dua.l t:..) eocisJ contra61.ct1ou 
prov1dea.the basis for his solution to the problt?rn o+' uniting man 
and h1s fellowa. We ab&ll see, too, how Hs.rx'a untty of' thou.~,h\ 
wlth I~ealtsm'a moral doctr1no of the 'eocial org;nts~· te main-
tained. 
"' -~"'"' ~~ -~ - __ ....,_ 
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•• have •••n that, xarx1aa bol4a it to be .-ceaaary tor \heir 
aelt•real1aat.1on •• aoo1allJ integrated huaan be1nga, tor .. •'-r• 
ot the prol•t.ar1at. to act aa a olaaa to over\brow the es1at1aa 
olaaa aoe1etJ• ODl.y 'b7 do1n& ao an4 1n oreat1ns a new aoo1et7 
oan 1D41v14.al1aa \rulJ blooae realtae4 throu~ ~ tree oollee-
t1ft Ute or •n. We auat. exaa1De, however, 1n greater detail 
the ua t.ure or Jlarx '• aootal soal, ~rt1oul.arly 1n the 11pt. ot 
\be chars• that he 1a an exponent ot •herd worahlp~(7•>. 
In Marxian Pb1loaophJ \h1a aoo1al goal 1a the dlalect1cal 
•JDthea1a ot the oontr&d1ct1ona or olaaa aoc1et.J. Aa 1n 41aleo-
t1oal logic the aynt.hea1a 1a 1mpl1c1 t 1n the nature or the olaah• 
1ns \era• or the previoua oontra41ct1on and ao in Marx1aa the 
ol&aa-leaa aoo1ety 1a 1apl1c1t 1n the nature or bourseo1a olaaa-
aoo1et.7. !be rtle or the proletariat and or aoc1allJ-conac1oua 
1D41v14uala 1a the espl1oat1on~~ th1a lapl1oat1on. The olaaa-
_...---~) 
1••• eoolet7 le the ~~•DI determ1n1D8 huaan h1etor1o&l 
developaent.. 
Por both 1nd1v14ual aD4 aoo1al aora11t7, too, thla fora ot 
.· 
aoolal orsan1aat1on 1a the 41aleot1oal aynthee1a ot eth1eal prob-
1••• and the tora ot aoc1etr under wh1ch 41aleot1cal l1v1ns be-..... In th1a, Karzt••• tollowa the Ideal1aa ot a oer-
~ 
(75) Aea1n, Ooll1ngwood, vhoae dootr1ae ot the 'aoo1al coaaUD1t7' 
aa 41aleot1oal baa been 1nvaluable in elue14at1ng nrt-a1n treD4a 
in pol1t1oal thousnt. 
) 
• Tl • 
Yhloh there are no t1xe4, unJ1.el41DS contllota. It. ia tJlat war 
ot lite baaed upon \he lategrat.ion ot t.he individual and the 
aoolal whole t.hrou!b the operation ot reason, ra~er than torce, 
upon hu•n attalra. Thla involvea, turt.her, that resource• -
huaan aDd natural - are used in a wa7 benetiolal to all Mabera 
ot ao~1e-lyrlt)r .. ,.l•t1• that. contliot.a are reconciled 'bJ di~oua-
..... ,· i .J, 
aion and noi tor .. , aa& ~\ ~it.ical development. 1• dJnaaloallJ 
'- \..--1 'J , >/ I ' t . 
~·•4_ upon tr'li-m'~'~'"·. "'' ( ,,··•..! 1J. "· •• 
~ ... . ;..' I .~ ..... A 
' ':ro be more speoiflo, ~-.... .l\.~ 'briefly reOt.\ttJ.,tulat.• what 
l r•·. , 
.,.rx urge• ahould and will be abolt'a:Mitli~ '~.~ revolution. run-
; j •. \. ' • .• 
••nt.allJ, Marxiaa ia opposed ·'\? t~ .... ~,!tpp.oai ~1~•-~·•-.n 11141-
vidual and general interest" whio~._la ro<iteO fW to:1 ~o_n~·o·-.uns.at. 
aoo1ety which 1• depeDdent on the diviaion ot labour··~-~h1ob 
i 
aatea man •a slave to his deed, to the activity troa whidb be oan-
not. eacapeM(76). 
8uoh a clash ot 1ntereat• t1n4• 1t.a.eouroe in the doainanoe 
ot the prot1t.-aotlve in eoolety, in the exiat.enae ot private prop-
ert.J in the means ot' production, d1atri'but1on and exoha~, aDd 1D 
the olaaa rule (expreaaed t.hrousn the at.at.e) or one group over 
ot.b.era. Marxiaa urs••· therefore, that private propert.J, econo.-
ic exploitation and the profit incentive. olaas-rule and the exla-
t.enoe ot claaaea, ~he State and the rule bJ toroe are the obJee-
t.1vea asainat which the revolution 11 4irecte4. 
!be coamuala\ aooiet7 11 baaed upon an attempt to aatiafJ 
hu.all a.e4a 1n a part.ieuJa,r wa7. All hu.an hietor.r, for Harxiaa, 
CT') 
.. 11 -
1a a Pl"oe••• ot anawr1!1f5 aeeda through :toraa ot aoo1al orpnl-
aat1on wb1Cb 1n t.belr t,ura produee new needa. In all earlier 
h1ator7 the anaverins ot aeede haa reated with particular elaaaea, 
unaatiataotor11J aDd without either tlexib1lit7 in adapting thea-
aelvea to expaDded 4eua4a and without the neeeaaar:y equal1tr ot 
trea tMnt to,~ all umber a ot aoeiety. The olaaa-leaa aoe1et7 
1a sore ~ble aD4 aore able to anawer ex1at1ns and tuture hu.aa 
\ 
needa DJ Ylr\ue, of the taot that it ia a "••lt-rul1118 commun1t7", 
1.e. (hat. form o"1 o.....-t.y in which e-veryindivid~l 11 1a .. •1YM. 
I ' . . 
treelt 1n the eu'rc11ae ft t.at corporate W'lll ,and 1n which d1aoua-
T 
ai.on ia the baala of• dec1Slon. 
!h1a o~ty beooaes ,oaa1ble when those contrad1ct1ona la-
herent 1n olaas-aocietJ have been relloved and the 1ndi vidual M• 
ea.. a t-hrough bia nee4a and reason integrated vi tb h1a tellowa. 
Uader eOilll\Uliam, tberetoN, MD attains hie tull at.atua e• ... 
'bteaua• he baa establlahed colleotl"" control over all social ln-
at.itut1ona which 1ntluence hla lite. Human1tJ become& aoo1&11ae4 
&D4 .. n•a 1ndiv1duallty becomea aod1f1ed and enriched rather thaD 
n-.rpd aDd deatro:yed. 
loe&aliy 
!be aoo1al soal, however, 1a not attained auddenly out it ia 
the reault ot obange and 4evelopaeat,. It 111 the end ot a prooeaa. 
!be •aelt-rul1ng oo..uD1t7" 1• itself reached only through a per-
lol ot aelt-controlle4 aoolal 4evelo,..nt. It be!lna to exlat 
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- uauallJ Ylolent - act. 
When th1a takea place there 1• eatabllabed that fora ot 
aoo1et7 known aa aoolaliaa and defined, trequentlJ, aa the •Re-
Yolut1on&rJ Vlotatorahip ot the Proletariat•. Saaentially· aoo-
1al1aa 1a the atage ln aoolal develo~nt when ~e proletariat 
la the ruling claaa l.e. when the atate ie 1n the banda ot that 
olaaa which actuallJ operates the meana or production and who tbr-
ougb their own reYolutioD&rJ aot now not onl7 operate but alae 
own aDd direct the operation or these means. Man ae 'civil' &n4 
un aa pol1t.ical beooae uD1ted. M&n'a eoonoJiic lite and •n'a 
pol1t1oal life beooae .. rpd. 8ocial1am,' then, 1nvolvea that 
the new proletariat atate eatabliahea a planned econoar UDder 
wh1ch ownership and control or the means o,t production become Yea-
t•4 in the atate operat.ed, teaporarllf (1.e. until the aboll\loa 
or ~w1tber1ng away~ or the etate), in the 1ntereata of th• voPk!ng 
ol&aa. 
!ble atase or hiatorieal develop .. nt baa been called bJ Harz 
·~e 41atatorah1p of the Proletariat". thia pbraae ia extre .. lJ 
uoleu aDd aubJect t.o .ary1.ft! interprets. tiona. Although never 
4et1ne4 c1ear17 &ild neve,- uaed trequentlJ in Marx' a wri t.ln~a the 
phrase baa come iaportant 1n that it h&a eo• to be uaed aa a 
Juat1fioation for a rora ot totalltarianiam bJ a aln~le partJ all 
a atat~ bureauoracr. There exiata a S.Ddenor, that ia, to ea-
plOJ the pbraae to JuatitJ a 41otatorah1p over tha proletariat 1n 
the naae of the proletaria-t,. 
It 1e apparent, however, that the phrase cannot 0. eaplo,e4 
to defend either aingle part7 ~o\&11\arlaDiaa or a 41ctatorahip ot 
• T4 • 
Jlarz regarded bourgeoia deaoorao7 aa non-4eaoeratlo 
preciael7 because he held that eaaent.iallJ it waa a dio\at.orabip 
ot the bourseoiale who, by virtue or their own.rahip an4 control 
ot the .. ana ot production • i.e. the real lite or the people • 
were no\ :reapoulble tor their actiona to the oOIUI\U.\1\J aa a 
whole. · 'l'be polit.ioal lite ot the aaawlit7 ia, UD4er bourpe1a 
cleaoeraor, not on. with the eoonoa1t lite, and 1t la the eea0111o 
lite wb1oh 11 b&'io. 
81a1larlJ, ~he called aoc1&11aa "diotat.orahip of the prole-
tariat~ beoauae it involved a a.w rul1na ol&aa. Tbia aubat.it.u-
t.ion or rulill@ claaaea waa held neoeaaar7 b7 Marx beoauae be be• 
11eve4 tirat, that it waa the tirat. and neareat approxlaation to 
a 4eaooratio at.a\! and aeooDd, that it waa the f'irat. atap in \be 
prooeaa, eaaent.ial to true demooraorJ, or abolition ot the at.ate 
!1 auoh. 
the proletarian 4iotat.orah1p waa, that. ia, ~e tlrat olaaa 
It waa, tJlen-
tore, aore 4eaooratio t.ban previoua ainorit7 4ioiatorah1pa • 
bourgeo1~ or feudal • but. it waa atill a dictatorahlp beoauae 1\ 
involved or iapl1e4 toroe. 
!be diotatorabip or the proletariat involve• the abolltioa 
not ot c!eaoorao7 itaelt bUt or ita peou11arl7 ooureeoia fora aD4 
the eata~liah~aent or a atate ln which 4eaooraorJ attaina the hilb-
eat .. aaure oJ.patible with the existence or a atate .. ohine. "It 
1nvolvoa the ab&t\eria« or the ro~r ••ate power and ita rop1aoe• 
•nt bJ a new aD4 reallJ 4eaooratlc atate•(77). B7 th1a &npla 
means: 
~~~F. Engels "Introductio.n to 1 01 vil War in France ••• 
• 
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1. Election to all poata - a4a1n1atrat1ve, Judlolal aDd 
eduoa t1onal on the basta of un1 veraal aurrra.se, with the rlgbt 
to recall dele9- tea at any time. 
2. ·!h• erection, bJ the expedient or paying all ottloiala 
wagea equ1valeJlt to thoae or workera, ot carriere aploat oareer-
. 
lea and a our.auorat1c rul1n& claes. 
In the taot that thla plan - and ita oonoom1tant deoeatr.l-
1aat1on of control - 1a an extreuae form or Clemooracy, we oaa 
••e proof that Marx v1aual1aed the d1ctatorah1p of the proletar-
iat aa the tranalt.1oa a\age to o01a11Ulllaa; ae a tranai t.1on whioll 
eabo41ed to the maximum poaa1ble ex~ent the democraory or the 
next stase and. not one which, a1m1116 at oommun1am, aought to at.t&ln 
1t through the eatabll&baent ot a torm or aoc1etr the .. 1n cbarao-
ter1at1oa of wb1oh were opposed to future deaocrat1c develo~nt. , 
loo1al1am repreaenta the prel1a1DarJ atep toward• the ooD41-
t1on UDder which aa Marx, 1n h1a eaeay on the Jewlah Queat1oa, a&Ja 
•the real 1nd1v1dual man ls identical with the citizen, an~ b&• be-
ooae a eaner1o be1ng(78) in hia empirical lite, ln hls 1n41vi4ual 
work, in hia individual relat1onah1pa" • tor "not Wltil II&Jl baa N• 
eoga1aed and oreaniaed hie own capao1t1ea aa aoc1al oapac1t1ea, 
an4 oonaequen\lJ the aocial tore• 1a no lo~r divided by poll~ioal 
power •••• will huaan ... noipat1on be achieved". 
-
0. Ruhle oomaenta z •Hantind will onl7 be able to puraue ita 
(11) *Giner{o being* ia an obscure ~ra•• lnvolvine a theorr et 
the mature of .an vhioh Har.x never •xpl1oitlJ g1vee. ro 4eal 
at len!th with it here would be, boweTer, irrelevant to our \be ... 
We aerel7 note lt• 41tfioult1ea. 
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... ae1patorr ascent aucoeaarullJ, whon i~ becomea coapetent to 
aaae everr 1Dd1vi4ual willing and able to bring bia aubJectiYe 
a«be .. or life into harmonr with the objectlve evolut1onar7 
aeheme ot aoo1et7 • wben the private indivi~ual 1a wbollf mers-
M ln t.be aeaber of the epeaies. Onl7 t.he objectively aoc1al-
1 .. 4 and aubject1velJ oommunal1aed hu.an being will be able to 
etteot, the 8 .. DC1p&\1on Of a&nklnd, thUI beeoming maa~ar Of 1ta 
own ta t.e 11 ( 79 ) • 
!he princtplea embOdied 1n the paaaage are. 1n eaaent1ala. 
\boae which are alre&dJ noted. 
por\ant dltferencea in Ruhle'e approach. He exagger&tea the 
MaPXian eapbaaia upon the communal nature ot future societ7. ro~ 
Marx the aoctal integration or the 1nd1vldual 11 not an end 1n 
1taelt but the foundation upon which 1ndiv1dual1aa can ax1at. ror 
Ruble it ia &I the 1n4iv1dual is 'objectively socialised and aub-
ject.ivelr oommunal1sed' that he 1s tree, He must be 1vholly' 
.. r8e4 ln 'the member or the apec1ea•. Marx d1st1ngu1shee thoae 
aapeota or individual life wh1oh are private and those which are 
aoclal and he dsa1rea that they ehoul~ not confliotJ Ruhle at-
teap\1 a IJDt.heaia wh1oh 1s, in tact, a reduction or man aa 1D41-
Y14ual to man aa a apeoiea. Ruhle'• error 11 Collingwood'• tor 
bo\b ••• Marx aa a worab1pper or the herd. 
pert.a auoh worah1pJ Ooll1~ood does not. 
Ruhle, however. aup. 
Ruhle 'a coament empbaeiaee the Jv'l.:arx1e.n doctrine that aa aoo-
1al •n 11 alao •t.1oMl anc! aa aoc1al an4 rational •n 1a f'l'M. 
(Tt) o. lbahle. "larl •rx .. p. 66-T. 
' I 
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!be IOOlalla\ aoaietr - aDd in \hia 'h• oa.aun1at aoo1ety too 
in it.a oolleotiYe orpnlaation or lite beha••• ratio.a&llr ao-
oord.iD8 to an apee4 plan tor agree4 enda. 
fb.ia tbeorr ia a 1'4tPl7 t.o the obars• that aool&liaa la 
4&J18erou to 1Ddi Yiduali t.y. It 4eD1ea ~· ••r1 preaiaea ot tbat. 
attack Yiz. that .an ia •sotlatioal and a pri.ate atom whoae 
whole relation to hia rellowa ia one ot .. bellWI oanlwa contra 
oanea•. It aooepta the real indi Yidual a a the man who ln"sra tea 
bia purpoaea aad will with the purpoaea and willa or h1a tellowa. 
It repudiates the "traotloD&l•, bO\trseoia Mn. Marx a&Ja Sour• 
' seoia aoo1et7 doea not ra1ae ltaelt above 1t~ egoism and •aooletr 
1taelt ••• appears aa an external trame tor the individual, aa 
a limitation or h1a original 1DdepeDdence. The aole bond which 
counecta h1a with hia tellowa 1a D&t.ural neceaaitJ aDd pr1Yat.e 
lntereat, the preaervatlon or hla propertJ and nla egolat1c per-
aon"(So). • 
Marx doea not denJ the ex1atenoe o~h• 'ego1atical iD41•14• 
ual'; he den1ea that it la a ooaplete ~of man and he hol4a 
~t the aoolaliat/ooaauniat aooletr unitea 1nd1v1duala aD4 !1••• 
aa outlet to individual esolaa in soo1allJ useful act1Y1t1ea ra-
\her tban ln ~· priva\e atru861• ot eoonom1o aelt-intereat,(ll). 
(80) K. Marx •The Jewish QuePtionft ~uoted bJ Ruhle. 
(81) ··~· \he encouraeement or 'eoc1al1at oompet1t1on in the 
U.a.&.R. Caape\1t1on 1a direoted to oaaaunal eD4a. 
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Soc1al1sll aa we have eeen involvea: 
1. t'he r.t.ent.1can of the atate in ita .. proletarian 
fora•. This retention ia Justified t1rat on the ground tbat 
no change oan come 1mme41atel1 but onl7 &a a result or eyolut1on-
&rJ development and seoond, aa a coroll&rJ to the above, tba\ 1\ 
ia 1aprao~1oal to &bol1ah the at&te wb1ob will autosat1callJ 
•wither awa7~ when the reauanta of olaaa rule - class intereata, 
aurv1vors or bourgeoisie wbo haye not accepted ~he oh&nse &&4 
oounter-revolut1onarJ aot.1v1t1ea - Which require organiae4 
force to oppose thea b&Ye been removed. 
2. Tb.e teapor&rJ aain\aiunoe of wage a and other ao.n-
entarJ inoent1vea. Tbeae althoush barneaae4 to oo.aUD1t7 eDda 
are purelJ \r&naltorr - a reanant or ol4 14eaa. 
l. Ever w14en1D6 4eaoor&cy. 
co-un1aa eat.aila the tinal wi t.berins away or the ata t.e 1A 
& prooeaa ot 1noreaa1ns deaocrat.1aation and decentral1aat1on or 
&4min1strat1on. It 1a activelr hoatile to the atate as auoh. 
·In t.h1a 1t. atanda w1t.h Anaroh1aa. Bevert.heleaa li&rx'a t.heorJ 
on t.h1a point, althou@b perb&pa 001 of bia great.ea\ a1nsle contr1• 
button. to pol1tieal thousnt, baa been one or the aa1n aourcea of 
contua1on. 
-.rx bolda that although aooi&l man is not naoeasarilJ a aea-
ber ot a at.ate. Hia aemoerahip or a atate is a faot.e.r oper&t1ft 
ap11Uit hls true aoc1al N&l11& t.1on. .Marx, that. 1a, by regal'tl-
lDC \he at.at.e 1n. an eapir1oo-h1at.orloal taahlon toraul&t.ed. a t.heo-
- 79 .. 
rJ hoat1le to that 1dent1f1c&t1on Of IOC1ety and ata~e found 1D 
~ 
Greek political tb1nk1ng(82). For 14arx t.be atate 11 onlJ the 
product or man's social nature in tbat it is the outgr.owth ot 
aoo1ety. It ts, however, a maahlne built out or the oeoeaa1t1ea 
ot the .. 1nta1nance or elGss rule. It 1a an 1nat1tutioft of aoc-
tet.J produced by claaa-d1~1s1on; it 11 no more eaaent1al t.o 
aooiety 1n its present fora than claaa rule 1s eas~nt1al(8'). 
Marx wa~ concerned with the state sa it ia and waa in ~e 
aet.ual world. and the te.ctor·s 1n the actual world operatina to 
produce the atate are rel~t1ona and forces of production and the 
' atruggle between cla•~••· 'l'he atate r•ault.a from aoclal contra-
4ict1ona. It is the central power erected in the ~~~• of or4er 
to preserve certain aoolal and production relatione and it m&kel 
permanent t.bf 4ivia1on ot society into ruled and rul1n&. !be 
atat.e 1a "•n'a deed become an allan power over b1a'•. It· oe-
co•a con.aol14a ted. 1nto • power over soo1ety and to the control 
ot the or8&n• ot this power political conflict 1a dir•cted. lt 
1a throu~h the state that 1nd1v1duals' relations with each o~er 
are re IU la ted. It 11 in the interests or the pr1v1le8fd that., 
in the laat analyaia, the state acts tbrou&h ita Judici&rJ, ita 
executiM or 1ta legislative. It ia the creation or claaa-aoote\7; 
tor that reason the proletarian revolution ia directed ult.l .. telJ 
agalnat the a tate. 
The real human 1n41 ,1dual tor t-4ar.x.1am is he who, ll0irate4 
. {12) 'loila'' the e{~y-aiate or eoc1et, were identified bJ the 
Greelta. 
(S,) !he •1nta1nanoe uDder oGmmunlam or cent.r&l a4m1n1atrat1M 
orpna 11 not eollll14ered the M1nta1nancte ot the at.ate. ~ 
state 1a, DJ definition, the orsan ot olaaa rule. 
• eo -
troa econQmlc exploitation, att.ainfiJ tre•dom 1n the eelt-ru11D! 
fhe state ex1Pta 1.e a barrier to th1a \DUe 
human freedom; ·and thus 1.n. a Yery real aenae the rund&ment.al 
atrug@,le in society 1e the tndiv1dual verPua the at.ate. 
Marxtas 4oea not hol~ thle on the aame ground aa thoae in-
41v1dual1ata for whom the atate, ae the embodiment or eoclety, 
waa the 1nat1tut1on &£Sinet which man had to etrug.Fle(84) or to 
which he had ~eluctantly to aubalt(85). Hoat111ty to the State 
mar arie• troa an egoiet1e competitive philoeophr tor which the 
1D41"f1dual and h1a bodily plee.auree were bla1c. Tbla view m-
' quently regarded the eta te •·e e neC9flllery evil on the seme Er,J"OUDd. 
aa 1 t rfl!&r<!•~ society e.s e.n· artifi~le.l crest1on tor protection 
against v1olenoe. 
ror Marx, on the other hand, the individual and society will 
be trul' at one when the etate no longer exiata. Hie oppoa1t1oD 
to the at•t• der1vea from a view ~f man •• naturally sociable 
and wb1let thla Yiew pleeea acc!.ety in a position of importance 
1t doe• not, aa the tnd1Y1dual1at poe1t1on tends to do, make aoo-
1a.l 1net! tut1one more a,nd sore powerful tor reaaona of expe41enor. 
!he atate, for Marx, embod1ee repreeaion and exploitation. 
It 1a hoet1le to treedoe. W1t~ the end of the etate man become• 
both lord oYer nature ano maeter or h1meelf" i.e. free. The Marx-
tan concept of treedoa, then, is of par·amount importance 1n our 
analye1a and lt 1• to th1s the.t we muet now turn. 
(84) N. St1rner, tor example, and 
(85) •arlJ U'\.1l1t.ar1ana. 
f----------------------------
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rne4oa &114 Bete••1 t.z 1a Jlarx 
We cannot entirely confine our 41aouaa1on ot t~a aubJeo\ 
to t.he pol1\1oal aphere with which we ar.f aa1Dl7 oonoerzut4. We 
ahall have to, ln outlla1na Drx•a view ot poUtloal treed.oa aDd 
11141•14ual UbePt.J. relate it to h1a baalo d1alect1oal· •rnt.heala 
ot treedo• aDA neoeaaltr. 
we •1• however, ooaaenee our cona1derat1on ot treedoa bJ 
aot.lns th• •liberal• doctrine tha't baa beooae al.lloat a tru1aa 
.. ODS Wea\ern pol1t1oal \beor1ata. !h1a, the doo'trin. of aoeial 
a'traalaa1 la atat.e4 bJ Prot. B.J. La.ak1(86) aa tollowa : •uber\7 
... 
means abaence or restra1nta it 1• ea&ea\1allj a a.gative thing~. 
fbia view is to be found in Bo'bbea and in t.be ut1l1tar1ana. It. 1a 
1apl1c1t 1n 1nd1v1du&l1at anarchlam and underlies ~e competitive 
eap1ta11at o1v111aat1on or the laat o•ntur:r and a halt. AI &Df• 
\n1ag ao~ than a partial tr~tb1 Marx holda that. the doctrine 
ls coaplet•lJ untenable aa soon aa san aa aoolal 11 related 1n 
any real and dJnamtc wa7 to man a a 1n41 vidual. 
It 1a neeeeaarr, th•retor•, to qual1tJ \hia neeat1Ye 4oo\r1a. 
•t 11MllY14•Uaa 1n teraa wh1ob relate t.M 1Dd1v1du.al soo4 &Dill 
1at.N•t. \o that ~ood and lnter••t or the soo1al whole. the •1•v 
\bat t.r.e4oa beoomea qu.l1t1ed and l1a1~ed in \eraa ot the good 
or aoc1etr &a a whole 1s the theoret1oal Juat1t1cation tor the 
1aoreaa•4 &Dd 1noreaeins regulation over and H1nterfereaced 1n 
the WQrltins of the etconom.J of society wh1eh experience and pl'&c-
\1ee • the U.s1a, aa we have seen. or all theory • have neoeaa1-
----------------"---·-- --- -"-" _________ " ____ _ 
(If) B.J. taak1 : •orasmar or Pol1t1cs• p. 146. 
. ' _,. 
~··' 
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tat.e4. It. has beoo• clear that "resulation •••• is the ooue-
Q.uenoe or gregar1ouaness(87)". It has become recognised t.b&t. 
treedom - as Marx realised • aust. be interpreted in a poai-
The Marxian Y1ew 11 an 
at.t.eapt. to IJnt.belile the t.rutbl tbat. freedom 1s abaenoe or re-
straint with the neoea1it&r1an1aa or the universe aa a whole aDd 
with the easentiallJ guided qual1t.7 ot all true prosreaa. 
In his critiQue or the Gotha Programme Marx reveal1 that, 
whilst. he ia concerned to base individual freedom upon aa aucb 
n.gative libert7 aa poaa1ble he cannot. adai~ at.oaiam into &DJ 
clear formulatiOn or political alma. The Gotha Prograame he re-
garda as be 1ng too full of ".aere phra.aea*'. And Marx makes clear 
thE..t hs ls a.1.c1ng at a society in which not only are the 1natru-
ments of labour commonly owned out their product& are commuD&l 
property. Individuals thus become liberated bJ i08itive IOOi&l 
action from subordination to the division or labour. on this 
traae is built the co-operative communist society in which, Marx 
holds, is ~ealieed, through mutual aid and co-operation, the lib-
erty.or the individual. 
Under com~unie~ man bec~m~a tree becauae, the uncert&1nttee 
• 
an~ dlcbotem1ee ot h1a material life having bien removed, he ia 
tree to do. He ts tree, that 1a, when he 11 able to create, \o 
expreaa his nature or his personality in hie work. .Marxism be-
lievee that, although this may involve freedom from reatrtctlona 
from outetde the individual, freedom i.a eaaentie.llf aelr-deter-
a1net1on in an~. throueh sccisty. Regulation and restriction 
tu.,et ~ IJlt-1aPoted !.Df~1reoted towatt •st!!4 ·~~~~~--~Pr~•~•~d~oa •.
, ) i;aa .. , op. e1t.. p./ Ul" 
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11 ooapatible with neceaeity for it 11 the recognition or aDd in-
t.esra tion with nece1ai t7 •. 
•social lite", say• Marx(88), "ia eaaent1ally practical" • 
. 
Freedom, then, ia s&ined bJ the individual when hia "praxia" ia 
1ntegra"4 with the dpraxia" or the commUDitJ. The lava or 
treedoa are the laws or reaaon. In aonrormins to reason and the 
oolleoti•e rationality(89) or the deciaiona or an equalitarian 
aoo1et7 the 1nd1vidual 1a treer than in a competitive stru&~le 
cw.C 
ot indlvidualiam. J"Nedom il ability to doA to be what one bJ 
nature ia. The poaitive condittona tor thia develo~ai muat be 
present tor freedom to be a reality. ~rxiam sees no oontradio• 
tion·between the conce~ta of freedom and historical neeeaaltJ. 
It resarda the idea tr*t freedom is essentially treedow from ao ... 
't.h1ns, 1.e. as the opposite of restraint, aa auperf1o1al. To a 
ll.tted extent freedo~ ~ fre&dom from restraint. To 'be free, how-
ever, the indivi~ual must make h1a actions, hls ~ aotiona •••• 
"the conscious and !!:!!. expfeaaion or necesa1 ty( 90 )••. ., Free-
.. 
4·011", aaya Engela in Ant1-Duhring, •• the ncognl tion of nec&aaltJ* • 
• 
Marx holds thst to be free ia not to escape rrom the domina-
tion or natural lawa; it 1e rather to have such knowledge ot 
theae lava that theJ may be directed to human ende. lreedoa 1a 
the introduction 1nto the course of natural determination of a aew, 
positive, human determinant. 
f88) theaes ~n Feuerba~ 
'1'h1s deter·m1nant is hwnan knowledse 
(89) .Ae expreaae" in the over-all plann1ne, ot' the economy. 
(90) G. v. Plekanov "11he Individual in History''• State iubliahera, 
Moscow, 19AA. p.l3 
- 8.4 -
l h'UII&n teleological (or End-g1v1q) dlreotlon, 
of tree w111 la ao ~r aa he can make dec1a1ona based upon acou-
rate knovleds- of the real world. It la aa the un1verae 1a regu-
lar and eubjeot \o law that the content of man'• Judgaenta about 
The 1ndl vidual 1n a world he 
doea not, underatand and tt.~.e lawa or wbloh are unknown to him la 
at the mercy or treDde he cannot predict• hla deeielona and h1a 
action& are uncertain and potentially erroneoua. Recognition 
and understanding or the neeeaaltJ to which both man and the natu-
ral world are subject give• to ~n a meaaure or freedom wlthln 
neceaei tr, for he can control and dlreot both b.imself .. nd -.xter-
nal nature"'. 
The freedom or individual• is not absolute. Indi-viduala are 
tact.ora wit.hln a larger situation and, aa hlatorical an1mala 11 
History, tor Marx, ia made by men, 
~ 
however, and •the activ1t1ea or individuals cannot help being 1a-
portant 1n hlstory"'(91). It i~, therefore, to the eourae ot h1a-
tor1 that we must look tor the realie~t1on or human freedom la ao-
oiety - for Marxiam holda, w1th Hegel, ths.t history 1a the pro-,. 
oese of the gradual real1aation of treetom. 
a use a. 
Freedom 1& gained lD 
Firat, aan, throut~ the widening of ec1ent1f1o knowledge, 
&*ina an ever-lnoreaain! independence rroa and power o•er natural 
torcea. Th1a treedom 11 realised ln the de•elopment or tore•• 
ot production and mechanical devleea. It 1a, however, but the 
The eecond ls the control o-ver the soo&al 
(91) G.v. Plekanov op c1\ p. 17 
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'•\ion of oollaottve ends. 
~1on w1~h h1a tallows. 
He becomes truly himself ln eo-op~ra-
!be 1n41vidual ia really ~e when the bourgeo1A confl1ot 
.-.tween prlvata and !eneral interest 1a r•ruoved by the aboli~1on 
pPlv&t.e 
et proper\JJ wh•n tbe feudal concept ot r.lat1ons between men aa ... 
JltlMn &114 not. aonetary 1s restored 1n a new rorm; when the bour-
,.o1• l4ea or nuaan equality 1e replaced by the real1mat1on that 
.. Dare equal only from one .notnt ot v!ew(93); and when reason 
~~ oolleetiftly appl1et1 throu,;l' aoetal actt·:)n to the. organ1ae.t1on 
' 
•onac1oua and "history beoomee oonsc1-:>ue of 1 tsel.f'". 
Marx, therefore, wh1lat rejeot1ns the glor1t1oat1on ot t~ 
et.ate and t.ba 1nherent.oauerY&t1aa ot traditional Idealism, coaea ; :. 
: Tloae ln his doctrine ot treedoa to \he I4eal11t po11t1on that 
~ traedoa ~o ~he Ideal1•t 1a aelt-real1•at1on tn and througb aoo1e\JI ' . If 
~t the individual 1s inaeparable from hie environm.nt and thAt 
( -,. 
' 1\ 1a as he truly becomes part or 1t that he 1e tree and aoral. 
~ f'i}) 11 Jl18ht", Marx argue a, "o:r 1 ta yery nature can only cone 1st 1n 
;.¥ • appl1cat.1on ofan equal at,andard; but UMqual 1nd1v1duala (!Ill 
• • would not be 1nd1Y1dua.ls if they werd not unequal) e.rs only 
~ wawra l.a by an equal at&Ddird ln 10 fir a a tii•y are -brousht. UD4er ...,# t equal point or view, are tsken from .')ne defi ntv3 Jt1de only ••••• 
. ~~ nothing else aeen 1n thea, ever7thi~ el•e being 1gnors4. 11 
,.,..,.rl arx a "Ori t1que or Goth• Pro~.mme • (.My e!Dphaata) 
:...- ' 
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ll&rx aooepts t'rie i1agel'l..an \.aea t'nat t.'na 1'eal \~ l'at\~r£.\ b\lt n• 
insists the,t this means that the aotue.l gains 1ncrea.e1ng ree.lit7 
aa 1 t beoomee tnorea slnf'lY rat tonal ln the evoluti ona.ry C!eve lop• 
aent or aoaiety. Society can only become resl through the sl1mi-
nation of oontrad1ot1one, a.r:~ for Harx the real, (i.e. the coher-
ent.), aoo1ety 1e the free society an~ the 1ndivldual attalne rea-
lity within the.t eoc1ety to the extent that he 1e 1.n har:r.on1 with 
it.. 
In •esent!als this view 1e tt~t of Sradley 1n d~y Statton 
and 1te Dutiea(94)~. In this essay Bradley hol~s t~at th~ 1ndi-
Yidua.l ls Itoral s.s .he fulf1le th~ functions of hie social pte1tion 
tor by doing eo he expreeeos h1roself ee carr.pletely s.e he can with-
ln society .... e,nd selt-expreselon or self-rae11s~t1::m 1! the es-
eence or morality. 
Marx "• moral theory of'" fnorv:raua.L1arr. x-a .f'l."c.1'1fs- C:ctJ:>3' "-rv,n:~~,&Yr 
-nr7 largely. 
llld1vidua1. 
~~rx, however, e~phns1sea the active role of the 
He must not, Marx ur0es, merel:{ be wha,t he 1e; he 
,ae't. make h1meelf en~ hie environment • Se lt-rea lier>, ti on, thfl t 
• .r t 1•• !!. attained" through any soctety, but t.hroulj1 a dynamic and 
ehangtng society 1n which tb~ role c! the 1nd1vijual 18 revolution-
Whilst, therefore, Marx's ~oral theory ls r~volut!onary a~d 
baee4 upon the belief th~t the 1ndiv1~ual an~ society are ~1alee­
Uctally 1nterdependt.Jnt, ther~ are also -3laments ·Jf Hobt!l!an !'nl.lter-
lal1•• 1n 11.. For Marx the f~ndemental foroa w1th1n human h1!• 
\or7 la no\ the abstract idea or freedom but the 1nd1vioual'a ataulale 
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torA .. ~rlat aeour1t7 and peace. Human morality is tased firm-
17 upon the belief that the aatia!ao~ion of material needs 1s 
the first obJective both of aoc1&t1ea and individuals. 
however, appreo1atea ~hat selfish, egoistical 1ad1v1duallsm is 
aelt-contradlctory and hia mater1e.11a11 1a modified both OJ b.1a 
ada1aa1on that society, a~~ougn a biatorlcal, changing •nt1i7 1 
1a the natural end of rational beings and by his refusal to re-
cluce man to mere matter. .ttia moral and polt1oal ti.l&OrJ was 
therefore both a culmination of lndividuallam and a deru&l ~r 
aoc1al a toalam. 
Aa individualist Marx postulates &.s deeira.ule, neceesCJ.ry and 
ine"Yitable the claaaleas, anarohlet aocletJ. l·~arx wae hoetlla 
to anarchism pure11 on grow1da of taotlca; he ascociut9d h1meelt 
w1th its objective of a atateleaa oQamunlty in which government __. 
la replaced by adm1n1atrat1on.t force oy oo-o~er6. tlo~i 1n ":h1ch 
there are no external reatrala~a placed upon th~ individual; 1n 
which t.he 1nd1v1.dua.l 1a the UH>st 1wport.ant moral a.r1d ,a:>oll t.ica.l 
• 
Marx velievea that 9oeroi1JD. wlll oe re;;laoec bJ 
mutual agree!llent. and "self-control'' by 1adl vidu.uls t.nrough soc-
On the other hand, Aarxlaa represents the culn:iua tl-.Jn of 
t.h&t trali1tlon or pol1t1oal t.bou.sht whicb. rel.ludlates t.he hed~n1•­
t1c and competitive 1nd1v14ual1am of Ut.il1ts.r1an1sdce aud other•. 
Both thla 1:ld1v1dual1sm - w11.h lt.B vlew t.llG?.t t.bu state sxtota 
to avoid a permanent "war or all againat alln and Absolut-e 
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t4eal1sm rosult 1n tho glor1f'icA.t1.on of the state end. tn eta.te 
total1tarieniam over the 1nd1T1dual. Againet the!e totalitar-
ian tendencies Marx hold~ that •man ts free ...... by reaeon ot 
hie post ti ve e~trength to aeset't hie true 1ncU vlduE.ltty" and "that 
it 1B only 1n society that .," deve:opa h1s real ne.ture, al1\1 the 
atren!th of his nature must be measured, not with the strength at 
t.he 11olated 1nd1v1c5ual, but with tha 1trength of soc1ety(96). 
!blt doetr1ne demon~tratea Marx's affinity to the Platonic trad1• 
\ion that the et.ate (society) ts rran wtit ls.rf"et. 
l•rx1em, 1n short, repreeente e. eyntbeeie betw'len th!!t hedon-
l~t view and the Iceeltst. It reec~~ises the truth of he~on1aa 
\bat •n 1s governed by "1nteref:'te .. ana 1 t r.1ontfiee and enr1chea 
'tthBt truth by the ncoeptt.nce of tha view that n~lln 1m a creatuN 
ot reason a.nd, hence, a bearer of values. Man, for Marx, 1s a 
true 1nd1v1dual ae he most 1"-..tlly embodiee th~t common element or 
reason which unites tim s.n~ h~ F fello~·:~. 
Marxism, then, is not e. hen\-worsh1pp1'1t: cr5r;,t1; 1t \.e not 
hdet11e to 1n~iv1<'!uellsm e.nd 1t te not a doctrine which ,~l-:lr1:t'1ea 
the state. It contains '.·;t thtr: 1 t, howevttr, e.s;>eots wh1eh, 11" 
exagge!'l8.ted produce a toteltts.l"io.ntsm bas\.oally un-Jt.iarxie.n but 
trsw1n! the1r juat1f1eatton from Marx. It 1s to theee that we 
aat. turn and we muat dec1<!1!1 whether they do 1n flll.ct undermine 
our \heats that YArx1sm 1• s. theory a carcUnal point or wh1oh 11 
a reapect for and e. protection or the tnd.tvtdwal personallt:y. 
(96) .E. Marx a "The liOlJ F&.m1ly11 '.-J,uoted by H. Selsam "Soo1al1sa 
aad Eth1a•~ p. 85. 
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It ia import.ant to inveatip te Marx' • •t.ho4ologr upon hie 
tbeorr ot tJle individual. !he aetho4olOSJ ot O&rt.eaian philoao-
Pb•r• involved the uae ot tJle .. theaatical and, trequent.lJ, alao 
In po1t.ioal 
theorr thia aeant the diacuaaion ot .. n in t.eraa which .. de it 
poaaible tor aocial problema onlJ to be •••n troa the point ot 
view of nat.uraliaa. Hence, •n can M reduced to a creature 
soveru.d exoluaivelJ bJ law. ot the PhJaiaal un1v•r••· In pol.i-
t.ioal phil.eaophr t.hia l.eada to a Moh&n1oal detera1a1aa the re-
ault. ot which 1• either to place the at.at.e in a po•ion of aupre-
UOJ over a ut.urallJ warrins aooiet.r or to •• it. neutral ia a 
atruggle between individual• tor aelt-assrandiae .. nt an4 power. 
Thua it. ia vital tor ua to decide whether the Ht.hodolog aad, 
aore parti.alarlJ, the .. t.hodologioal preauppoait.iona ot Karxiaa 
run counter to the phil.oaophJ ot the ind1v1dual which we ba.e eo 
tar found hia to hold. 
Marxiaa, althou!b it. repreaenta· 1taelt aa an atteapt to pro-
duo• a aoientifio theorr or hiatorr, eoono~c• aDd political orsan-
iaat1on, ia not., baaicallJ, a pbil.oaopby derived traa the .. cb&Di• . 
cal tranaterranoe of the oak&or1ea ot any .,..1a;l ao1enoe to 
t.heae brano"Ma Of tnowle4p. Marx rejected auch ~tteapta; holt• 
ina that eaoh 'level' of realit.r bad it.a own law• aDcl ahou14 be 
1nveat.ip.te4 bJ •th04a peculiar to thoae lava. !blla, deapit.e 
t..he uae •d• by Ma:rxiaa • part.ioularlJ in the vork ot Kqela • 
ot teru aDd. aaalo81•• derl ve4 troa •tural ac1ence, auch ae~04o­
lo1J vaa ao\ •••eatial to it.. 
' . -. 
- 91 .. 
.Marxiu, doea how~er, clala and atteapt to be, aclent1tlo 
ln the broa4 aenae ot aearohiq tor and 41aoo~er1q lawa. u 
auoh 1t ia, 1n a aenae, hoatile to ita ovn et\oal in4i~i4uallaa. 
Science baa no place tor the UD1que or tor lava which a4ait 
ot exoept1ou. It atwapta to toraulate preoiae, replar treD4a. 
Maniaa at.teapta to do thla in ita atud7 ot hlatorr aad to deduce 
aolent1tlo atateaenta abOut the paat aDd future hlator, ot man-
lt1Del. It attaapta to aake Y&l14 predictiona about future •~•nta. 
In \he formulation of auch lava 1t would aeea \be iD41~i4ual baa 
no plaoe tor the 1ll41~idual ia u.nlqu. aDd to .predict hie tutUJ:~e 
la to 4ellJ hia tree4oa. 
Jevertheleaa, 1t ia 4a~roue to conclude tbat Harx'a ~ 
ot tera1nolo17 4er1~ed troa phralcal aoienoe neoeaaary oomsita 
hi a to 'believlns that blltt.orr ia reallJ analosoua to pb.Jaioa. lie 
uaea auan teraa aa •aoo1al foroea of production• an4 K~la in a 
- ~ 
letter apeak• ot "the our?e of hlatorr .. which •r be plotted aDd. 
the •~•rage axle ot 14eolosioal development •••n to approach aore 
and aore nearlJ •parallel to the axle of the O\ll'ft of eooaoa1c 
de~elo,..nt the lonser the period and the wider ~e tiel4 dealt 
v1~(97)•. • 
The 1D41 viclual ln aDJ thorough-soiD6 acience of h1atorJ aut 
tMt an aoo14ent aD4 auat be eppoaed. to the .. •••ea• whoa• reaot1ona 
aDd beha~iolU' are pre41ct.able • fbla placea ua in a 41~e... tor 
w II&Julot., apparentlJ, poatulat.e indi"1idual tree4oa in \he face 
ot the knOVD taot of replar behaviour 'b7 whole aoe1al sroupa. 
(97) Letter to lt.arkeaburs 1894. 
------
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Bor can we escape \hia 41leama bJ a reaort to I4eal1at .. taPhJaicl 
tor, aa in Bepl, hiatorr il the tmtolding t.hrougb. the 41aleot1c 
ot the A'baolute l4ea. Hlat.orr "woru• on a regular logical pat.-
t.ern. Ita eD4 la teleolosioallJ det.era1ne4, 1 ta deYelopaent 
rational aDA 1ne•lt.able. 'lb1a doctrine, auat. be aa boat1le to 
\be rile of the ind1Yi4ual as aoient1tio lawa applied to h~n 
h1atorr. 
The Marxiat reapoa.e to t.hia cr1\i~ue ia, howeYer, tbats 
ftnt, tne4oa ia the &IIOciation throush reaaon w1\h \he 
•aaentiallJ r&*ioD&llJ prooeaa of biatOrJ and the 14entit1oatian 
of t.he in41Yidu&l through hia reaaon with the iDherent ratioD&~ 
ot prosreaa. 
ADd 8eoo.D4, Man1aa aeea the indi Yidual in two aapecta • 
prlarllJ aa a beiDS in the •aa i.e. a aeaber of a claaa, behaY• 
1as 1D. bia "olaaa• OJ" "collect1Ye11 aapect iD resular predictable 
Y&JI 1n acoor4anoe with the loglo of aelf•1ntereat and claaa-ideo-
log. In th1a aapect. the particular, un1~ue qualitiea of 1D41-
.,...._la are lpored bJ olJaen1q onl7 t.hoae actions, 4ea1rea aDd feel• 
t.llp ..... to all aDd b7 rea1111ng that alt.hou!b in the •aa indlvl-.. 
._la' willa elaahe4 the reaul t. ot thia olaah vaa ao•thiD.S ewer 
..a abo•• &DJ particular will or deaire. Wb&teyer tb1a reaultant 
Will waa •11•4 it. w&a open to i:n.Yeat1ption ac1entif1callJ aDd 
'• PN4ic\1on &114 tJle tol"'l\llation of "lava•. Marx held that lt 
wa ,_lble ... irioallJ t.o ahow t.hat olaaa behaYiour waa snerae4 
at.17 _. ••••lo aot1"t'&t.1on and that broa4lJ lt. waa •ter1&1 la-
..,.., tu.t, 4et.ei'II1M4 t.be oourae of lliatorJ &D4 f01"M4 t.M b&a1a 
